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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the shifts in Taiwan’s independence policy since 1991 to 
determine whether Taipei has been more restrained at times of military vulnerability.  
The objective is to determine whether Taipei’s actions favoring independence are 
dependent on threats to its security from offensive actions by the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), and if so, to determine the effect of the PRC’s growing military capability 
on those independence policies.  The level of U.S. support for Taiwan is a significant 
component of its relative security.  Therefore shifts in that support are evaluated and the 
resulting implications for U.S. policy assessed.   
Taipei’s official policy has hovered around the status quo with occasional 
excursions toward independence since 1991.  These excursions occurred for the most part 
when Taipei was relatively secure from PRC threats, and were curbed when concerns 
were expressed by Washington.  PRC military strength and the level of U.S. support not 
only influence Taiwan’s independence policy, but also Taiwan’s domestic politics.  For 
peaceful resolution, Washington must continue its policy of strategic ambiguity and, as a 
new KMT regime in Taiwan eases the tension of recent years, it should reconsider non-
involvement and be prepared to play at least a passive role in PRC-ROC negotiations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
The United States has been closely involved in the Taiwan question since the 
beginning of the Korean War, and its peaceful resolution remains a major concern of U.S. 
security policy today.  This thesis examines the shifts in Taiwan’s independence policy 
from the end of the Cold War and seeks to determine whether Taipei has been more 
restrained at times of military vulnerability.  The objective is to determine whether 
Taipei’s policy actions favoring independence are dependent on threats to its security 
from offensive actions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and if so, to determine 
the effect of the PRC’s growing military capability on those independence policies.  This 
thesis also assesses the resulting implications for U.S. policy.   
Much has happened since the Cold War on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that 
influences the relationship today.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial 
straits of Russian defense industries have led to the increased availability of Russian 
military technology, some of which was purchased by the PRC.  This greatly enhances 
the military capability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  Due to these purchases 
and the PRC’s growing indigenous technology development, the PRC is making progress 
towards closing the military gap with Taiwan and its U.S.-supplied defense systems.  
Additionally, during this period, Taiwan became fully democratic, allowing for the defeat 
of the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) candidate for ROC president in the 2000 
election, bringing the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) – a party that supports 
Taiwanese independence – to power. 
Motions by the Taiwanese president in recent years to revise the ROC constitution 
and to provide a referendum mechanism for a declaration of de jure independence 
prompted the PRC to adopt an anti-secession law in 2005, making it illegal for Taiwan to 
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declare independence.1  The key concern of the United States is peaceful resolution of the 
issue, regardless of the outcome, and though Beijing has stated its preference for a 
peaceful resolution, it has reserved the right to use force if Taipei declares independence.  
Assessing the correlation between Taiwan’s policies and its relative security is essential 
to determining U.S. policy with regard to Taiwan.  The following sections provide a 
broad overview of pertinent events in the three-way relationship between the PRC, 
Taiwan, and the United States, followed by a literature review of previous work on the 
issue and approaches for analysis.  Lastly, this chapter provides the methodology and a 
roadmap for this thesis. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In order to assess the importance of each of the determinants of Taipei’s 
independence policy, a brief background of important events and actions is provided to 
assist in understanding the subsequent chapters.  The question of Taiwan’s status has 
been open since the KMT fled to Taiwan during the civil war.  Beijing views the optimal 
resolution of the Taiwan Question to be reunification.2  The objectives of Taiwan’s 
leadership have evolved as its politics has transformed.  When the ROC government led 
by the KMT fled the mainland in 1949, reunification with the Chinese mainland under 
the ROC government was one of its primary goals.  The KMT regime did not allow 
alternative political parties to exist.3  Taiwan’s democratization unfolded after 1987 and 
culminated in open competitive elections for the office of ROC president in 1996.4  The 
KMT enjoyed success in all major elections until 1997, when its lead started to slip and 
                                                 
1  Alan D. Romberg, "Promoting Cross-Strait Stability, Avoiding Catastrophe," Pacific Forum CSIS 8 
(2005), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0508.pdf, (accessed July 26, 2007). 
2  International Crisis Group Staff, China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente, (Seoul/Brussels: International 
Crisis Group, 2005), http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/taiwan_strait/b042_china_and_ 
taiwan_uneasy_detente.pdf (accessed July 26, 2007). 
3 Cal Clark, "Taiwan Elections," Asia Society, 
http://www.asiasociety.org/publications/taiwan_elections.html#polin (accessed July 26, 2007). 
4  Ibid. 
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the DPP enjoyed increased representation in government.  The DPP’s rise culminated 
with the election of President Chen Shui-bian in the 2000 presidential election.5 
The fundamental differences between the two parties have been especially 
highlighted in the last decade: 
President Chen Shui-bian, his ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 
and their more radical allies in former President Lee's Taiwan Solidarity 
Union (TSU) represent the "pan green" camp -- the part of the political 
spectrum that continues to push for strengthening Taiwan's status as a 
country permanently separate from China.  On the other side, the "pan 
blue" camp, made up of the formerly ruling Kuomintang (KMT) 
Nationalist Party and its allies the People First Party, is generally more 
cautious about [antagonizing] China.6 
Additionally, these differences in politics have had an effect on Taiwan’s security.  For 
example, in 2001 the United States approved a new arms sales package, which was held 
up by partisan “blue-green” politics in the Legislative Yuan, with some parts finally 
approved for the FY 2007 budget.7  This particular situation is examined further in 
Chapter IV. 
Actions in the international arena by President Chen Shui-bian have certainly not 
reduced tensions in the PRC-ROC relationship.  Continuing similar pitches by former 
ROC President Lee Teng-hui since the mid-1990s, under Chen’s leadership, Taipei has 
sought admission to a number of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), 
including the World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations (UN) under the 
name Taiwan.8  Chen has also made motions to change the name of the country, the flag, 
and provisions of the constitution “that identify Taiwan with China.”9  In the summer of 
                                                 
5  Clark, "Taiwan Elections;" ICG Staff, China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente 
6  Ibid. 
7  David G. Brown, "China - Taiwan Relations: Continuing to Inch Forward," Comparative 
Connections 8, no. 4 (2007), http://www.csis.org (accessed July 26, 2007); David G. Brown, "China - 
Taiwan Relations: Dueling in the International Arena," Comparative Connections 9, no. 2 (2007), 
http://www.csis.org (accessed July 26, 2007). 
8  Ibid.; Chien-pin Li, "Taiwan's Participation in Inter-Governmental Organizations: An Overview of 
its Initiatives," Asian Survey 46, no. 4 (July-August 2006), 597. 
9  ICG Staff, China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente. 
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2002, President Chen referred to the situation as “a country on each side of the Strait” 
directly contesting Beijing’s “One China” principle.10  Lastly, in response to China’s 
passing of the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, which would make it illegal for Taiwan to 
declare independence and justify the PRC’s use of force, Chen Shui-bian disbanded the 
National Unification Council (NUC) and stated that the “National Unification Guidelines 
that the Council created would ‘cease to apply.’”11 
Washington has attempted to subdue Chen through the conveyance of private 
messages and numerous public statements, including open opposition to Taiwan’s 
offensive weapon development.12  Washington walks a fine line between Beijing and 
Taipei through a policy of strategic ambiguity, which seeks to deter aggression by the 
PRC while discouraging Taipei from antagonizing Beijing.13  The main concern for 
Washington is that Taiwan’s motions towards independence could provoke a military 
response by Beijing, thus posing a significant threat to U.S. security.14 
The military balance between the PRC and Taiwan has been the main obstacle to 
Beijing’s use of force to resolve the Taiwan question.  The balance has traditionally 
favored Taiwan, but some analysts feel that the balance is shifting toward the PRC.15  
Others, including some that believe the balance is shifting, feel that Beijing is not yet 
capable of overtaking Taiwan by force, and that much progress must be made to get 
                                                 
10  Shelley Rigger, "Taiwan in 2002: Another Year of Political Droughts and Typhoons," Asian Survey 
43, no. 1, A Survey of Asia in 2002 (January - February 2003), 41-48. 
11  Alan D. Romberg, "The Taiwan Tangle," The China Leadership Monitor 18 (2006), 
http://media.hoover.org/ documents/clm18_ar.pdf, (accessed July 26, 2007); Romberg, “Promoting Cross-
Strait Stability, Avoiding Catastrophe;” Kerry Dumbaugh, China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and 
Implications for U.S. Policy, (December 7, 2006). 
12  ICG Staff, China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente; Brown, “China - Taiwan Relations: Dueling in the 
International Arena.” 
13  Dumbaugh, China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy; Shirley Kan, 
China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy - Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and 
Taipei, (2006). 
14  Robert S. Ross, "Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement," Foreign Affairs (2006), 
http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/2006/FA-Ross.pdf (accessed July 26, 2007). 
15  ICG Staff, China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente; Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without 
Catching Up," International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001), 5; Michael S. Chase, "Defense Reform in 
Taiwan: Problems and Prospects," Asian Survey 45, no. 3 (May-June 2005), 362; Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, (2008), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf, 41, (accessed March 14, 2008). 
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closer to that ability.16  This controversy underscores the importance of determining the 
current trends in the PRC-ROC military balance and its impact on Taiwan’s relative 
security, and subsequently Taiwan’s independence policy. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been some research done over the years to determine whether there is a 
correlation between perceptions of security and independence sentiment on Taiwan.  
Brett Benson at Duke University compiled public opinion polls designed to measure the 
conditions under which the Taiwan public would favor independence or unification over 
the status quo.  In most surveys, the majority answered in favor of the status quo, 
however polls that set favorable conditions for either – unification if the PRC and Taiwan 
became “politically, economically, and socially compatible” or “independence if peace 
can be maintained” – produced different results.17  The compilation of their research 
shows that over twenty-five percent of the public supports independence or reunification 
on these set conditions, thus the Taiwanese public tends to be more supportive of 
independence when it is less concerned about the mainland threat.18  Public opinion has 
sometimes differed from actions taken by Taiwan’s government and, more specifically, 
its president; therefore, it becomes important to determine what, if any correlation there is 
between relative security and independence policy promotions.  As Wu Yu-Shan states: 
Taiwan's domestic political shifts, it is clear are constricted by and need to 
be viewed within the context of an ever-evolving strategic triangle 
between the United States, Taiwan and China.  While Taiwan's security is 
threatened by the mainland, it is guaranteed by the US and no leader in 
Taiwan can ever afford to neglect these two cardinal facts.19 
                                                 
16  Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Can China Conquer Taiwan," International Security, (Fall 2000), 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/ohanlon/2000fall_IS.htm (accessed July 26, 2007); James H. Nolt, 
"The China-Taiwan Military Balance," The Project on Defense Alternatives, (January 7, 2000), 
http://www.comw.org/pda/nolt99.pdf, (last accessed May 13, 2008).  OSD, Military Power of the PRC, 43. 
17 Brett V. Benson and Emerson M. S. Niou, "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Security 
Balance in the Taiwan Strait," Security Studies 14, no. 2 (April-June 2005), 280. 
18  Ibid., 274. 
19  Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwan's Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations," The China Journal, no. 53 
(January 2005), 35. 
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There are different ways to examine the question of whether or not Taipei will 
take actions toward independence as Beijing closes the military capability gap.  That 
Beijing has stated that it will take military action if Taipei declares independence raises 
the question of what would cause Taipei to claim independence regardless.  Differences 
exist even within the traditional schools of international relations.  According to realism, 
a state’s actions are largely based on preserving national interest and balance of power.20  
In structural realism, defensive realists would assert that security is Taipei’s principal 
interest and that it would not seek more power to the detriment of its own security.21  
However, offensive realists would argue that Taipei would risk its own security to gain 
more power in the international system if it thought it could do so successfully.22  
Beyond realist perspectives, others would emphasize nationalism and ideology as a basis 
for Taipei’s actions.   
James Fearon argues that there are rational explanations for why states would 
choose war over negotiated settlements, particularly “when lack of information leads 
them to miscalculate relative power or resolve.”23  This would be of particular concern if 
Taiwan miscalculates Beijing’s level of resolve.  Another approach, the offense-defense 
theory, contends that peace is more likely when capabilities favor the defense, but that 
“misperceptions and miscalculations of the balance often lead states to initiate conflict 
when they otherwise might feel secure with the status quo.”24   
Graham Allison proposes yet another model to explain the behavior of states – 
Bureaucratic Politics, also known as the third model.  Allison’s model differs from realist 
and rationalist models in that there is no single unitary actor, “rather many actors as 
players, who focus not on a single strategic issue, but on many diverse intra-national 
                                                 
20 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations:  The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New 
York: Random House, 1973).  
21 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). 
22 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton, 2001). 
23  James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 
(Summer 1995), 379-414. 
24  Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and 
International Security," International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000), 71-104. 
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problems.”25  In this model, decisions are not made rationally to take actions leading to 
conflict, but the struggle of politics that leads to a possibly unintended course of action. 
While the schools of thought differ slightly, they highlight the importance of 
determining the relative power of both the PRC and Taiwan.  This not only involves the 
military balance between the two, but also the status and capabilities of U.S. support in 
the event of a crisis.  How has Taipei acted over the course of this assessment?  
Examination of these two central elements to both realist and rationalist analyses will 
construe whether the provocative actions taken by Taipei since the Cold War can be 
explained in terms of one of the aforementioned schools of thought.  Determining how 
Taiwan has reacted in regards to the balance of power and its relative security historically 
will allow conclusions about its future behavior and may inform how best to proceed with 
the Taiwan Question, particularly in U.S. security policy. 
Many analysts argue that despite the closing gap between the PRC’s and Taiwan’s 
military capabilities, Beijing still will not be able to take offensive action for another five 
to ten years.26  The question therefore becomes, if the PRC becomes more capable of 
overtaking Taiwan by force, would Taipei be less likely to take action that would 
precipitate Beijing’s use of said force?  To answer this question it is necessary to examine 
the military balance between the PRC and Taiwan and how it has changed over the years, 
as well as the level of U.S. support and commitment to Taiwan’s defense.  After 
evaluating Taiwan’s relative security it is necessary to look at the internal political factors 
during the same period to see if Taiwan was indeed more reticent during periods of 
insecurity and more vocal during periods of security. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses congruence testing to evaluate the issue, examining Taiwan over 
different, key, chronological periods.  The evolution of Taipei’s independence policy is 
analyzed over three time periods that correspond to changing levels of relative security 
                                                 
25 Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in American Foreign 
Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry. (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), 358. 
26  Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up.” 
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and domestic political shifts.  Relative security for Taiwan will be defined by two 
independent variables (IVs):  (1) military balance between the PRC and Taiwan and (2) 
level of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense.  The third independent variable that 
greatly affects Taiwan’s independence policies are its (3) political parties and ideological 
camps.  A thorough examination of the three IVs will determine correlation with the 
dependent variable (DV), Taiwan’s independence policy.  The assumed relationship 
between the IVs and the DV is depicted below: 
 
Figure 1.   Relationship of IVs to DV 
 
The IVs will each be coded as having either a positive or negative effect on Taiwan’s 
Independence Policy, the DV.  A positive coding denotes favorable conditions for the DV 
to lean towards independence, while a negative coding serves to constrain the DV – 
remaining at the status quo or leaning away from independence. 
E. ROADMAP 
As mentioned above, this thesis is organized chronologically, corresponding to 
periods delineated by shifts in either relative security or domestic politics.  Chapter II 
evaluates the time period from 1991 to 1996.  This period covers from the end of the 
Cold War and the beginnings of democracy in Taiwan to the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 


















PRC.  Chapter III examines the period from 1996, covering the first democratic 
presidential elections, to 2001.  Using 2001 as an endpoint for Chapter III is useful 
because it is both the year President Chen Shui-bian enjoyed a plurality for his pan-green 
coalition in the Legislative Yuan and the year the George W. Bush Administration 
entered the White House.  Lastly, Chapter IV covers many of the most recent events by 
evaluating the period from 2001 to 2007 to examine the effects of Chen Shui-bian’s 
presidency and the PRC’s military rise on the dependent variable, as well as the three 
independent variables. 
Each chapter begins with an overview of Taiwan's domestic political movements 
and trends, including any events that significantly affected either Taiwan's independence 
policy or the other two variables.  Next, each chapter follows with an overview of U.S. 
commitment and support over the timeframe evaluated.  Lastly, each chapter concludes 
with an evaluation military progress made by both the PRC and ROC and evaluates the 
trend in the military balance between the two during each respective time period. 
Chapter V concludes with a summary of the trends discovered and analysis of 
possible political theories to define those trends.  Additionally, Chapter V includes a 
forecast, given current trends, of the future of Taiwan's independence policy.  
Furthermore, these findings are examined using policy analysis options to evaluate the 
continuing effectiveness of U.S. policy and to determine what, if any, changes need to be 
made in the American approach to the Taiwan issue. 
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II. 1991-1996:  BURGEONING DEMOCRACY TO CRISIS 
In late 1995 and early 1996, the People’s Liberation Army conducted a series of 
military maneuvers, including missile tests and a “large-scale amphibious landing 
exercise,” significantly increasing tensions in the Taiwan Strait for the first time since 
1958.27  What happened to spark such a response from Beijing, particularly when such 
progress had been made as the “1992 Consensus?”28  While Taiwan’s democratization 
process began in 1987, it did not make significant progress until 1991.  Additionally, 
1991 is important due to the collapse of the USSR, as the removal of Moscow from 
strategic triangle with the United States and the PRC had a significant affect on the 
region.  Therefore, evaluation for the purpose of this analysis will begin in 1991. 
The first variable that affected Taiwan’s independence policy between 1991 and 
1996 examined is Taiwan’s domestic politics and movements.  Democratization had a 
considerable impact on not only the vociferousness of Taiwan’s independence 
movement, but also on Beijing’s interpretation of Taipei’s policy, directly contributing to 
the Taiwan Strait Crisis.  As the United States sent support in the form of two aircraft 
carriers to the region, the level of U.S. support is evaluated next.  Of importance are not 
only sales of defensive weapons, but also levels of political cooperation between the 
United States and Taiwan.  Lastly, as the PRC directly benefited from the sale of Soviet 
weapons following the collapse of the USSR, to the growing detriment of the ROC, this 
analysis concludes by evaluating the military balance between the two in 1991, and 
assessing if and how the balance shifted over the first few years of Taiwan’s fledgling 
democracy. 
                                                 
27 Hung-mao Tien, "Taiwan in 1995: Electoral Politics and Cross-Strait Relations," Asian Survey 36, 
no. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1995: Part I (January 1996), 36; Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its 
Crux and Solutions," Asian Survey 36, no. 11 (November 1996), 1055. 
28 Gunter Schubert, "Taiwan's Political Parties and National Identity: The Rise of an Overarching 
Consensus," Asian Survey 44, no. 4 (July-August 2004), 540.  The "1992 Consensus" is an agreement 
between the PRC and Taiwan that there is only “one China,” while leaving the actual definition of “one 
China” open to interpretation to facilitate cross-strait dialog. 
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A. ROC DOMESTIC POLITICS AND MOVEMENTS 
On July 15, 1987, the KMT ended martial law in the Republic of China and 
allowed democracy to flourish.29  The democratic transition did not happen overnight, 
but the lifting of martial law was a very important first step.  Prior to the end of martial 
law, other political parties, such as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), had existed 
– but only illegally.30  The year 1991 is an appropriate starting point for analysis, not 
only due to the collapse of the USSR, but also because it marks the ROC’s first major 
national election and the beginning of the final stage of democratization.  The positions 
that had belonged to provinces from the mainland were to be officially abolished by the 
end of 1991.31  This section will highlight important events in Taiwan’s growing 
democracy, introduce the main political parties and their platforms, and evaluate 
Taiwan’s independence policy over this first time period. 
1. Democratic Progress and the Growth of Political Parties 
Lee Teng-hui took over the position of president and chairman of the KMT 
following Chiang Ching-kuo’s death.  In the early 1990s, however, his Taiwan-centric 
ideas highlighted a growing divide within the party.32  It is uncertain how many reforms 
could have taken place earlier if President Lee had continued to work toward his goals, 
but he realized that splitting the party was an even bigger risk, posing a threat to the 
KMT’s parliamentary majority.  If the KMT had splintered, the DPP would have gained 
plurality in key elections much sooner than it did.  As it was, in 1992, the DPP won 50 of 
the 161 available seats in the Legislative Yuan, a visible improvement over the 1991 
National Assembly election where the DPP gained only 66 of the 254 available seats.33  
                                                 
29 Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, "The First Chinese Democracy: Political Development of the 
Republic of China on Taiwan, 1986-1994," Asian Survey 34, no. 3 (March 1994), 213. 
30 Ibid., 222. 
31 Jurgen Domes, "Taiwan in 1991: Searching for Political Consensus," Asian Survey 32, no. 1, A 
Survey of Asia in 1991: Part I (January 1992), 46; Clark, "Taiwan Elections."  
32 Chao and Myers, "The First Chinese Democracy," 226.  
33 Jurgen Domes, "Taiwan in 1992: On the Verge of Democracy," Asian Survey 33, no. 1, A Survey of 
Asia in 1992: Part I (January 1993), 60; Domes, "Taiwan in 1991," 49. 
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Upon becoming legal, the DPP began consolidating power in the early 1990s and 
building a base from which to expand through the middle of the decade.  The DPP did 
suffer some setbacks in the early 1990s due to its extremely pro-independence 
campaign.34  This provides another good starting point for analysis, as the rise of the DPP 
in domestic politics can provide insight to the sentiments of the Taiwanese electorate.  
The DPP’s rise did not begin quickly, however; in a 1993 election for city and county 
positions, the DPP did not gain as much support as expected, and in fact, even lost one of 
its key local seats.35   
The problems the KMT had with internal factions in the early 1990s did not 
improve, and President Lee ultimately failed to hold the KMT together.  The mainstream 
faction of the KMT was comprised primarily of Taiwanese, while the non-mainstream 
faction, for the most part, included mainlanders and their descendants.  The tension 
between the two groups stems mainly from the difference in opinion about Taiwan’s past 
as a province of China.36  Taiwan’s growing democracy in the 1990s only made these 
previously repressed issues more evident.  The New Alliance faction within the KMT 
officially broke off, and established the New Party (NP) in 1993.37   
One important step that furthered the democratization process in 1993 was the 
approval of ten constitutional amendments – one of which allowed for direct election of 
the president by popular vote.38  While losses by the KMT in local elections in 1994 may 
have signaled trouble for the KMT, it certainly meant success for a stable democracy.  
The KMT maintained significant national and provincial power, but the election of a DPP 
candidate for mayor of Taipei, and the subsequent turnover of power, demonstrated that, 
at least at the local level, democratization was complete.39 
                                                 
34 Domes, "Taiwan in 1991," 49. 
35 Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwan in 1994: Managing a Critical Relationship," Asian Survey 35, no. 1, A 
Survey of Asia in 1994: Part I (January 1995), 67. 
36 Steven J. Hood, "Political Change in Taiwan: The Rise of Kuomintang Factions," Asian Survey 36, 
no. 5 (May 1996), 469. 
37 Chao and Myers, "The First Chinese Democracy," 228.  Wu, "Taiwan in 1994," 67.  Hood, 
"Political Change in Taiwan," 477. 
38 Wu, "Taiwan in 1994," 67. 
39 Ibid., 69. 
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2. Political Party Goals and Rhetoric 
The democratization of Taiwan produced a number of political parties, but only 
two held sway in 1991, the KMT and DPP.  In 1993, after the New Party (NP) broke off 
of the KMT, the political ideals of each of the parties started to become more defined.  
The NP holds most of the ideals of the original KMT, particularly the promotion of 
Chinese nationalism.  The KMT under Lee’s leadership began taking a “Taiwan-first 
approach” – that the needs and security of Taiwan take priority over reunification or 
independence – while still operating under the tenets of the original ROC constitution.  
On the other hand, the most liberal of the parties, the DPP, promoted Taiwan 
independence.40   
As the 1990s progressed, the political parties had to make small adjustments to 
their official rhetoric.  The DPP for example, by the time of the Taiwan Missile Crisis, 
had toned down its independence rhetoric from declaring independence to a policy of de 
jure independence – emphasizing that Taiwan does not need to declare independence as it 
had already operated independently since 1949.41  On the conservative end of the 
spectrum, in order to garner voter support, the NP had to tone down its nationalist 
rhetoric and state that the protection of Taiwan from PRC hostilities was more important 
than reunification.42 
3. Independence Policy 
One of the first actions taken by President Lee, once the democratic process 
started, was the formation of the National Unification Council (NUC) in 1990.43  The 
Council was meant to maintain stability across the Strait while Taiwan became more 
democratic.  It established Guidelines for eventual reunification that both safeguarded the 
public’s right to self-determination and kept Taiwan’s growing opposition parties in 
                                                 
40 Wu, "Taiwan in 1994," 67. 
41 Tien, "Taiwan in 1995," 36. 
42 Ibid., 37. 
43 Romberg, “The Taiwan Tangle,” 1. 
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check.  The Guidelines for reunification reiterate the “one China” policy of the ROC’s 
constitution – that there is only “one China.”44 
The issue of reunification or independence was certainly used by all parties to 
garner votes in the 1996 presidential election.  President Lee specifically used his 1995 
trip to Cornell to further the independence movement.45  However, while both the 
election and Lee’s trip sparked protest from the PRC – in the form of military exercises 
and missiles targeted into the waters surrounding Taiwan – the 1996 presidential election 
was definitely not meant to determine independence or reunification, as the Taiwan 
population itself was undecided on the issue at that time.46  The official policy throughout 
1991 to 1996 was maintenance of the status quo, with an increasing emphasis on keeping 
Taiwan secure from PRC action, regardless of what the individual political parties 
articulated. 
B. LEVEL OF UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO ROC 
The level of support Taiwan can expect from the United States is dependent on a 
number of factors.  The following section will highlight significant events that affected 
U.S. commitment during this time period and identify the overall trend for final analysis. 
1. Support for Political Movements and Political Interventions 
While the United States typically took actions to placate the PRC following 
formal recognition in 1979, the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 led to reduced concern for 
Beijing’s wishes.  Two separate incidents in 1991 highlight this period of increased 
support for Taiwan.  The first was the decision to support Taiwan’s membership in 
GATT – albeit as a customs territory rather than a state.  The second direct show of 
support for Taiwan was a criticism of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” solution to 
                                                 
44 Chen, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis," 1063. 
45 Ross, "Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement," 141. 
46 Cheng Tun-jen, "Taiwan in 1996: From Euphoria to Melodrama," Asian Survey 37, no. 1, A Survey 
of Asia in 1996: Part I (January 1997), 44-5. 
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the Taiwan question by former U.S. Ambassador James Lilley.47  Furthermore, in 1992, 
President Bush also approved the sale of F-16s which had previously been embargoed.48 
This perceived shift of support towards Taiwan was exacerbated in 1995, when 
President Clinton approved a visa request for President Lee to visit Cornell, after 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher had assured Beijing that the request would not be 
granted.49  The granting of this request resulted in the deployment of 150,000 PRC troops 
to Fujian Province, missile tests – without warheads – into the waters surrounding 
Taiwan, a military exercise using live ammunition, and a military exercise including an 
amphibious landing.50  The combination of all of these exercises at once leaves little 
doubt to the intention of those capabilities – reclamation of Taiwan by force – though not 
the intention of the exercises at that time.  The demonstration of these capabilities 
resulted in participation by the United States, in the form of two aircraft carrier battle 
groups deployed to the region.51   
2. Willingness to Defend Taiwan 
Following the United States’ recognition of the PRC in 1979 and subsequent de-
recognition of the ROC on Taiwan, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA) to further define the altered relationship between the United States and Taiwan.  
Prior to this, U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan was defined under the Mutual Defense 
Treaty, essentially ensuring defense cooperation.  Subsequently, defense sales have been 
both supported and constrained – supported by the 1979 TRA, and constrained by the 
1982 Shanghai Communiqué, which promises Beijing that the level of U.S. support for 
Taiwan’s defense would decrease over time.52  
                                                 
47 Alan D. Romberg and Marshall M. Bouton, "The U.S. and Asia in 1991," Asian Survey 32, no. 1, A 
Survey of Asia in 1991: Part I (January 1992), 5. 
48 Nolt, "The China-Taiwan Military Balance."   
49 Tien, "Taiwan in 1995," 36. 
50 Chen, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis," 1055. 
51 Ibid., 1055. 
52 "Background Note: Taiwan," U.S. Department of State, (March 2008), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm, (accessed March 18, 2008). 
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The United States has maintained that its paramount concern about the Taiwan 
question is that it is resolved peacefully.53  Kenneth Lieberthal describes the U.S. policy 
regarding the Taiwan question as one of “dual deterrence and dual reassurance.”54  The 
dual deterrence aspect is based on the ambiguity of U.S. military support.  Beijing is 
deterred by possible interference by U.S. forces, while Taipei is deterred by the absence 
of a guarantee for support, depending on the actions that brought on Beijing’s use of 
force.  The dual reassurance aspect balances the deterrence by reassuring Beijing that the 
United States will maintain its “one China” policy, while reassuring Taipei that the 
United States will not disregard its safety.55  Washington has long promoted peaceful 
resolution of the issue and is opposed to unilateral actions by either side that jeopardizes 
peaceful resolution, and uses the above policy to help achieve that end. 
The deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region during the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis at first seems to indicate that the United States is willing to commit 
forces to the defense of Taiwan.  However, this demonstration is merely a direct 
representation of Washington’s policy described above.  Taiwan had not, in any 
significant, clearly defined way, threatened the status quo in such a way that Beijing’s 
response was warranted; therefore, the United States sent a show of force.  In order to not 
escalate tensions, the United States kept the carrier battle groups out of the Taiwan Strait, 
which happened to coincide with Beijing’s wishes.56  Rather than demonstrating a 
commitment to Taiwan, Washington wished to demonstrate to both sides its continued 
commitment to a peaceful resolution. 
C. MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN PRC AND ROC 
In this initial period of analysis, PRC modernization is underway, and the ROC 
continues to acquire U.S. technology.  This section will detail significant production and 
                                                 
53 Chen, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis," 1065. 
54 Kenneth Lieberthal, "Preventing a War Over Taiwan," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (March-April, 
2005), 53. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Chen, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis," 1055. 
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procurement by the PRC and ROC, and then evaluate the overall capability spread to 
determine which the military balance favored. 
1. PRC Procurements and Development 
The modernization of the PRC’s military began in 1978 with Deng Xiaoping’s 
announcement of the Four Modernizations.  While modernization had been underway, 
albeit slowly as defense modernization was fourth in priority, 1991 is significant for the 
military balance not only because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also because of 
the Gulf War.  Iraq at that time had more sophisticated equipment than the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), yet the United States and the coalition forces had no trouble 
overwhelming even its advanced technology.57 
Some of the PLA’s newest equipment was acquired from Russia in the early 
1990s, including the Su-27 – on which the indigenously produced J-11 is based.58  Aside 
from these purchases, the bulk of PLAAF assets were older J-5s and J-6s,59 not nearly as 
capable and operationally available as the newer fighters.  The PLA’s strategic missile 
forces benefited from the development and deployment of the CSS-5 (also known as the 
DF-21) IRBM.60  The PRC also purchased and received delivery of its first two Kilo 
Submarines from Russia as well as its first deliveries of the S-300 SAM system during 
this time period.61   
While ability to acquire equipment and technology was increasing, the amount 
Beijing spent on defense was stagnating.  Some authors, such as James Nolt, cite 
Beijing’s decreased defense expenditure during this time frame as a diminishing military 
budget.62  This is shown not only by defense spending decreasing as a function of a 
                                                 
57  Nolt, "The China-Taiwan Military Balance."   
58 Ibid. 
59 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 178. 
60 Ibid., 176. 
61 SIPRI Trade Registers, http://armstrade.sipri.org/arms_trade/trade_register.php, s.v. “Suppliers: All; 
Recipients: China; 1985-2007; Weapon systems: All,” (accessed May 18, 2008). 
62 Nolt, "The China-Taiwan Military Balance."   
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rapidly growing GDP, but also in the estimated real defense expenditure.  Evaluating 
defense spending as a percentage of GDP provides an indication of the proportion of 
government funds used for the military, and is provided in this thesis to ascertain 
spending trends.   
During this time period, the PRC economy was growing at an average rate of 
close to ten percent,63 yet the defense budget received a decreasing share of available 
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Figure 2.   PRC Defense Expenditure, 1991-1995 64 
 
It is difficult to determine the actual amount spent on defense, as lack of transparency has 
always been an issue with Beijing.  The official budget announced by Beijing does not 
encompass everything related to defense; therefore, actual expenditure must be estimated.  
                                                 
63 Wang Shaoguang, “The Military Expenditure of China, 1989-98,” SIPRI Yearbook 1999: 
Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security, SIPRI, (Oxford University Press, 1999), 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_china_milex_01.pdf, 349 (accessed May 14, 2008), 350. 
64 Data for estimated budget and GDP obtained from The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, http://first.sipri.org/non_first/milex.php, 
(accessed May 14, 2008), monetary values in 2005 U.S. Dollars.  Data for official budget obtained from 
Wang, “The Military Expenditure of China,” 349, monetary values in 1989 prices, with USD exchange 
extrapolated from table on 347. 
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One organization that provides this estimation is the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI).  SIPRI’s estimate takes into account expenditure in areas not 
covered by the official budget, such as the Peoples Armed Police (PAP), Research and 
Development (R&D), Testing and Evaluation (T&E), funds gained by exporting military 
equipment, and imports – as it assumed that many imports are covered under special 
assessments, rather than the defense budget.65  This trend of decreasing spending is 
perhaps responsible for an increased a sense of security in Taipei. 
2. ROC Procurements and Development 
Prior to 1991, Taiwan had difficulty purchasing weapons directly due to embargos 
following formal recognition of the PRC by many of its former allies.  While purchasing 
actual weapons was difficult, arms components were not restricted and many U.S. 
companies assisted the development of Taiwan’s indigenous arms industry.66  Following 
the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, relations between Beijing and Washington cooled, 
benefiting weapons procurement by Taiwan.  President George H. W. Bush authorized 
the sale of F-16s and Harpoon missiles, both of which had previously been on the 
embargo list.  From 1992 to 1995, Taiwan procured $23 billion in arms from the United 
States as well as close to $10 billion from France.67  The following table provides a 
breakdown by year of weapons procured from the United States with associated values: 
 
 Item or Support Procured Value 
1991 
Modification kits for HAWK air defense system  
M60A3 Tanks 






                                                 
65 Wang, “The Military Expenditure of China,” 338-347.  




150 F-16 A/B 
3 Modified Air Defense System (MADS) units 
Weapons, ammunition, and support for leased ships 
12 SH-2F LAMPS ASW helicopters  







4 E-2T Hawkeye AWACS 
12 C-130H transport aircraft 
Weapons, ammunition, and support for leased ships 
Mk-41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) 
38 Harpoon anti-ship missiles 







1994 80 AN/ALQ-184 electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods 
Mk-45 Mod 2 gun system 
$150 million
$21 million 
1995 6 Mk-75 shipboard gun systems 
6 Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS) – shipboard
$75 million 
Table 1.   U.S. Weapons Sales to Taiwan, 1991-199568 
 
A majority of the weapons procured from the United States during this time period 
provide defense against an air attack.  The VLS, CIWS, and standard missiles (SM-1) 
provide shipboard anti-air defense, and the E-2C Hawkeyes provide airborne early 
warning.  This demonstrates that at least an initial attack by air is Taiwan’s primary 
concern.  Another interesting note is that only one major system was purchased to 
counter a PRC submarine threat, the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) 
helicopters and associated torpedoes, a trend that is worth following through the 
subsequent time periods. 
Taiwan’s military strategy also underwent a fundamental modification in the early 
1990s as democratization gained momentum.  According to Michael Chase: 
…Taiwan’s strategy shifted form emphasizing both offensive and 
defensive operations (gongshou yiti) to focusing exclusively on defense of 
the territory under the island’s control (shoushi fangyu).  This shift came 
as the ROC government formally abandoned all pretensions that it 
intended to retake the mainland.  Taiwan’s military strategy is now 
                                                 
68 Raw data for table from Shirley Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990, (2008), 50-51.  
Author modified some phrasing in column 2. 
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centered on the concepts of “effective deterrence” (youxiao hezu) and 
“resolute defense” (fangwei gushou).69 
This policy would eventually be amended again in 2000 to reflect greater emphasis on 
deterrence of action by the PRC.70   
 Though Taiwan’s strategy changed, its defense budget remained fairly constant 
throughout this time period, despite a growing GDP, resulting in an overall decrease in 
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Figure 3.   Taiwan Defense Expenditure, 1991-199571 
 
As part of an effective deterrence and resolute defense strategy, Taiwan also 
significantly overhauled its naval forces.  Most of the ships have either been overhauled 
                                                 
69 Michael S. Chase, "Defense Reform in Taiwan: Problems and Prospects," Asian Survey 45, no. 3 
(May-June 2005), 364. 
70 Chase, "Defense Reform in Taiwan," 364. 
71 Data for chart obtained from The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, SIPRI: Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_data_index.html, 
(accessed May 4, 2008).  Monetary values in 2005 U.S. Dollars. 
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following U.S. service, or indigenously built ships from U.S. designs.72  An updated 
naval force reflects an emphasis on blockade and amphibious assault defense and 
deterrence.  Additionally, as also noted above, many of the ship-based weapons procured 
from the United States in the early 1990s directly support defense against air assets – 
such as the VLS with SM-2s and CIWS – a likely first-wave in a PRC assault on Taiwan. 
3. Overall Capability Spread 
One significant advantage Taiwan holds militarily over the PRC is airborne early 
warning.  The United States delivered four E-2C Hawkeyes to Taiwan, and each aircraft 
is capable of tracking over two thousand aircraft, making it impossible for the PRC to 
launch an air attack without detection with just one E-2 in the air over Taiwan.  While the 
PRC is pursuing AWACS capability as well with the Il-76 from Russia, Taiwan would 
still be favored in a conflict, as a defender with AWACS maintains the advantage by 
denying its enemy the element of surprise.73 
The purchase of 150 F-16A/Bs in 1992 led some critics to argue that Taipei needs 
to spend its funds on other defense requirements, rather than fighter aircraft, though an 
increase in advanced generation fighters certainly favors Taiwan in the cross-Strait 
balance.74  Regardless of what Taipei spends it defense dollars on, one thing that is 
certain during this period is that compared with the military spending by Taipei, the 
PRC’s real spending “stagnated” while the ROC’s capabilities continued to increase.75  
Despite PRC modernizations, the military balance during this time period positively 
favors Taiwan. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The overarching trend for the in this period is liberalization and increasing 
democracy in Taiwan, which increases the ability of political parties to vocalize their 
                                                 
72 Nolt, "The China-Taiwan Military Balance."  
73 Ibid.  
74 Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990, 19. 
75 Nolt, "The China-Taiwan Military Balance."  
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desire for independence.  This trend in the first IV, ROC domestic politics, therefore had 
a positive effect on the DV, meaning the increasing liberalization contributed to an 
increase in pro-independence rhetoric.  The United States, while dedicated to peaceful 
resolution of the issue, continued to provide weapons to support Taiwan’s defense, with 
very little interference in Taiwan’s internal politics.  Therefore, the U.S. level of 
commitment will be coded as having a positive effect on relative security, as the DV was 
not restrained in any significant way by this IV during this time period.  The final IV, the 
military balance will also be coded as positive, as Taiwan’s continued advances in 
military equipment served to further widen the gulf of capabilities between Taiwan and 
the PRC, keeping the military balance firmly in Taiwan’s favor.  While the PRC did 
make some progress, particularly in aircraft and missiles, Beijing had still not made 
defense modernization enough of a priority to truly gain an advantage over Taiwan, as 
evidenced best by the stagnation in spending. 
While the DV did not lean significantly towards independence during this time 
period, it was considerably more so as compared to the prior regime.  Perhaps the most 
significant change in the DV is the growing acknowledgement among Taiwan’s leaders 
that Taiwan was, in fact, a separate entity.  The early 1990s also witnessed the 
relinquishing of the ROC’s claim as the legitimate government for all of China, which is, 
to some extent, a step toward independence.  The leaders, however, did not use the 
opportunity to claim independence; rather, they supported the status quo – the ultimate 
determination of reunification or independence would be determined at a later date, and 
under circumstances that were to the benefit of the people of Taiwan. 
The obvious success of Taiwan’s democracy in the early 1990s brought about the 
unavoidable side-effect of Beijing feeling threatened with Taiwan’s growing sense of 
independence.  The first direct election for president, as well as the timing and approval 
of President Lee’s trip to the United States were perceived as direct threats to Beijing’s 
territorial sovereignty.  This threat, combined with creeping advances in military 
capability, brought about the Taiwan Straits Crisis – in part, an attempt to sway the 
population of Taiwan away from pro-independence political leaders.  The Taiwan Straits 
Crisis in itself served to remind the international system of the precariousness of 
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Taiwan’s security and brought about changes to both U.S. policy and the policies of 
others internationally regarding Taiwan’s defense.76  The following chapter will provide 
a closer examination of these changes in policy and support, which will aid in the 
determination of the effect of Taiwan’s security on its official independence policy. 
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III. 1996 - 2001:  CRISIS TO ADMINISTRATION CHANGE 
Following the election in March 1996, Beijing terminated the military exercises 
that created the Taiwan Strait Crisis and both sides expressed a desire to resolve their 
differences.77  While the crisis was over, the underlying issues and causes had yet to be 
settled.  Throughout the rest of President Lee Teng-hui’s term, Taiwan continued its use 
of diplomacy to further its political goals.  Officials in government traveled to potential 
supporters to boost Taipei’s bid for UN membership.78  Taiwan still pursued diplomatic 
recognition during this period, as well as UN membership, however most initiatives 
failed.  Despite gaining diplomatic recognition from Macedonia and Palau in 1999 – 
bringing the total to twenty-nine official ties – international support for UN membership 
dropped to merely 13 states.79 
This time period saw increased participation in the democratic process, with 
Taiwan’s multi-party democracy spawning additional parties, thus the political 
atmosphere is evaluated first.  Second is the level of U.S. support and commitment to 
Taiwan’s defense.  Lastly, the military balance between the PRC and Taiwan is evaluated 
based on changes in spending and acquisitions for both governments following the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis.  This period introduced changes in both the level of U.S. support 
and the military balance, particularly as the 2000 elections approached.  The elections in 
2000 brought changes to the administrations of both Taiwan and the United States, thus 
the period of evaluation ends with the ascension of the George W. Bush Administration 
in 2001.   
A. ROC DOMESTIC POLITICS AND MOVEMENTS 
The first direct presidential election in Taiwan made it possible for other nations 
to truly accept Taiwan as a democratic entity, if not as a state.  This success did bring 
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78 Ibid., 1058. 
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some foreign diplomatic visitors to Taiwan – such as the leaders of Senegal, El Salvador, 
Paraguay, and Honduras – as Beijing and Taipei still battled over which China deserved 
diplomatic recognition.80  While democratic elections should have bolstered support, 
Taipei was losing more and more support on the international front.  South Korea and 
Saudi Arabia had already severed ties, and South Africa took steps to follow suit in late 
1996, leaving Taipei with full diplomatic recognition from only a few smaller South and 
Central American and African countries.81   
President Lee began his first elected term by reaffirming his personal position on 
the “one China” principle, that there is not currently one China, but two separate 
sovereign states, and only after reunification would there be one China.82  Aside from 
this change in traditional KMT ideology, the other political parties also shifted stances 
slightly to attract voters.  This section examines the goals and rhetoric of Taiwan’s 
political parties during this time period, and evaluates any changes to the official 
independence policy. 
1. Blue-Green Politics 
As the political parties in Taiwan branched out and splintered off, it became 
necessary to group the parties based on the primary difference in their political platforms 
– reunification versus independence.  The pan-blue camp favors eventual reunification, 
though the individual groups do not always agree on how, while the pan-green camp is 
considered pro-independence.83  While the KMT is primarily considered part of the pan-
blue camp, the latter half of the 1990s showed President Lee creeping toward a pan-
green, pro-independence stance.  President Lee Teng-hui presented his “two-states 
theory” in 1999 which purported “special state to state relations” between Taiwan and the 
PRC.84  The DPP, principal party of the pan-green camp, grew steadily throughout the 
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mid-1990s, solidifying itself as the primary opposition party, typically gaining thirty to 
forty percent of the vote, as well as gaining important local posts, such as when Chen 
Shui-bian was elected the mayor of Taipei in 1994.85 
In the 1998 elections for the Legislative Yuan, the KMT was able to reverse its 
downslide of the mid-1990s, and secure a firmer hold as the majority party.  This trend 
was furthered with the election of KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou as mayor of Taipei, 
defeating the incumbent DPP Chen Shui-bian.86  Interestingly, Ma Ying-jeou succeeds 
Chen Shui-bian once again, this time as ROC president.   
The DPP suffered more losses in 1998 than in the previous elections, but was still 
far from failing as a party.  The New Party, however, only succeeded in acquiring just 
over seven percent of the Legislative Yuan votes, which left its actual number of seats at 
an even lower five percent.87  The 1998 election also served to further solidify a new 
Taiwanese identity, in which Taiwan’s needs come first, and ethnicity and ancestral 
lineage diminish in importance.88 
The year leading up to the 2000 presidential election did not go well for the KMT.  
President Lee Teng-hui openly challenged Beijing by making his theory of two states on 
either side of the Strait public.  On German television, he compared the relationship 
between the ROC and PRC to the relationship between the two Germanys prior to 
reunification.89  Fortunately, this increase in tension in 1999 did not spark an identical 
response from Beijing as did the challenges in 1995 and 1996; however it did cause a 
break in the ongoing, “semi-official” cross-Strait dialogue, which would prove difficult to 
resume under President Chen’s administration.90 
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An additional issue that contributed to the DPP’s win in the 2000 presidential 
election was the KMT internal conflict between Lien Chan and James Soong.  As 
chairman of the KMT, President Lee chose Lien Chan as the party’s candidate, leading 
James Soong, a highly popular candidate and KMT member, to run on an independent 
platform.  Due to Taiwan’s electoral system, which requires only a plurality of votes for 
the election of president, and the negative mudslinging between Soong and the KMT,91 
Lien and Soong likely split the votes that either could have garnered on his own – giving 
DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian the plurality of votes and the position of president.92 
2. Independence Policy 
Following the demonstration of power by the PRC in 1996, the political parties in 
Taiwan all moved closer to the middle on the independence-reunification continuum, 
favoring the status quo until a decision would be made at a later date.93  The DPP shifted 
slightly away from its desire for immediate independence, in favor of security, while the 
KMT, predominantly under Lee’s leadership shifted closer to independence.  This shift 
by the KMT is also represented by Lee’s “two-states” theory, and only shifts closer to 
independence as the decade comes to a close.  This shift in policy in the mid to late 1990s 
is best illustrated by Wu Yu-shan: 
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Figure 4.   “Converging Policies toward the Mainland in the Mid to Late 1990s” 
(From:  Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics”)94 
 
This shift in political party focus caused many of the extremely pro-independence 
members of the DPP to splinter off and form the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), 
balanced on the other side of the spectrum by the pro-reunification New Party (NP).95  
The overall trend however shows that following the Crisis, the security of Taiwan was 
the primary concern, with Lee’s vocalized excursions toward independence increasing in 
frequency as the time period progressed. 
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B. LEVEL OF UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO ROC 
Throughout this period, the United States continued to maintain its position of 
peaceful resolution.  The Taiwan Strait Crisis did spark discussion regarding current U.S. 
policies, but different factions in Washington varied on the extent of assistance that 
should be provided.  The following section will examine any changes in U.S. level of 
support, including Washington’s willingness to defend Taiwan, and acceptance of 
political provocations. 
1. Willingness to Defend Taiwan 
  Following the Taiwan Strait Crisis, President Clinton “reaffirmed America’s 
‘one China’ policy,” and Secretary of State Warren Christopher further expounded: 
This policy is good for the United States, the PRC, Taiwan, and the entire 
region.  It has helped keep the peace on both sides of the Strait…[O]ur 
“one China” policy is predicated on the PRC’s pursuit of a peaceful 
resolution of issues between Taipei and Beijing…[Additionally,] as 
Taiwan seeks an international role, it should pursue that objective in a way 
that is consistent with a “one China” policy.96 
Some factions in the United States, however, favor recognition of Taiwan and a revision 
of the “one China” policy.  In 1996, Congress passed a non-binding resolution to “move 
beyond the Taiwan Relations act,” by ending the policy of strategic ambiguity, allowing 
for unconditional support to defend Taiwan in the event of attack or blockade.97  The 
non-binding resolution in actuality did little to change official U.S. policy. 
In accordance with the 1982 Communiqué, Washington has assessed the value of 
arms purchased by Taiwan annually to ensure the annual value, or the “bucket,” is 
decreasing.98  Despite this restriction, following the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Clinton 
Administration “quietly expanded the sensitive military relationship with Taiwan to 
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levels unprecedented since 1979.”99  Included in the increase in defensive equipment was 
a plan for Taiwan to receive early warning radars.100  Other defense sales during this time 
period are detailed in the following discussion of the military balance, under section two, 
ROC procurements. 
2. Support for Political Movements and Political Interventions 
The previously perceived tilt toward support for Taiwan following the Strait crisis 
began to change in the late 1990s.  Following President Lee Teng-hui’s vocalization of 
his “two-state” theory, in 1999, the United States placed the responsibility for increasing 
tensions in the Strait squarely on Lee.  Through the public denouncement of Lee's 
statements, it appeared that Washington had shifted toward accepting Beijing's opinion of 
Lee and his ideas.101  Additionally, leading up to Lee's comments, Washington had been 
placing increasing pressure on Taipei to negotiate with Beijing.  Washington was urging 
an agreement between Taipei and Beijing to reduce tensions and increase stability in the 
region.102 
Washington's criticism of Lee and his policies introduced a new phase in U.S.-
Taiwan relations, one of political intervention to reduce tensions in the cross-Strait 
relationship.  While still practicing the policy of strategic ambiguity, Washington began 
taking a more active role in limiting Taiwan's provocations by publicly denouncing 
incendiary actions, thus influencing Taiwanese policy.  This trend represents a decrease 
in level of U.S. support for Taiwan, and will only be shown to continue its descent in the 
subsequent decade. 
C. MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN PRC AND ROC 
It is during this time period that the possibility of a shift in the cross-Strait 
military balance first becomes apparent.  This section examines the development and 
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procurement of the PRC and the ROC during the late 1990s, and follows with a 
comparison of capabilities to determine the overall effect on the cross-Strait balance. 
1. PRC Procurements and Development 
After the stagnation of the early 1990s, the period following the Strait Crisis saw 
continued increases in the PRC's military budget even after accounting for inflation.103  






























Budget in USD Low Actual Estimate
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Figure 5.   PRC Defense Expenditure, 1996-2000104 
 
The chart above demonstrates that not only did PRC defense spending increase 
overall after 1996, but it also increased as a percentage of a rapidly growing GDP.  
Numerous organizations and institutions provide estimates for actual PRC spending due 
to Beijing’s lack of transparency.  The high and low estimates in the chart above are from 
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the U.S. Department of Defense and “include projected expenses for strategic forces, 
foreign acquisitions, military research and development, and paramilitary forces.”105 
During this time period, the PRC agreed to purchase additional aircraft from 
Russia, namely the SU-30, which is comparable to the Mirage 2000 used by Taiwan, and 
the F-15, F-16, and F-18 used by the United States.  While the new aircraft – to be 
delivered in 2002 – may be on par with those in use in the region, Taiwan alone has five 
times the amount of sophisticated aircraft.106  The PRC also agreed to buy two 
Sovremenny destroyers from Russia, which arrived in 2000.107  The PLAN also 
continued work on the Type 093 submarine – comparable to the Russian Victor III – but 
it would not be complete by 2001.  Another significant purchase from Russia that 
advanced the PRC’s submarine capabilities was four Kilo submarines, which being 
diesel-electric, are much quieter than the PLAN’s indigenously produced nuclear 
submarines.108 
2. ROC Procurements and Development 
Taiwan had a significant technological lead over the PRC, and up through 2001, 
continued to acquire significantly more modern weapons than the PRC – updating 
warships, airplanes, missiles, and tanks.  Taiwan’s Air Force, in this period, was far 
superior to the PLAAF.  Taiwan overhauled its inventory in the late 1990s so that all of 
its 340 fighters are superior to the PRC’s most capable fighter, the Su-27.109  The 
introduction of the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) Ching-Kuo and the delivery of the 
Mirage 2000 from France particularly furthered Taiwan’s air supremacy.110   
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 During the late 1990s however, Taiwan's defense expenditures began to decline 






























Budget in USD Budget as Percent GDP
 
Figure 6.   Taiwan Defense Expenditure, 1996-2000111 
 
As illustrated above, spending as a function of GDP also decreased steadily over this 
time, reflecting an overall decrease in the proportion of military spending as related to 
total government spending.  The sharp increase in spending in 2000 is due to the fiscal 
year covering July 1999 to December 2000, an 18-month period.112   
The United States was instrumental in Taiwan's acquisitions, including a plan for 
early warning radar systems and Patriot PAC-2 missile systems.113  The following table 
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 Item or Support Procured Value 
1996 
1,299 Stinger SAMs, 74 Avenger vehicle mounted guided missile 
launchers, and 96 high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle 
(HMMWV) 
300 M60A3TTS tanks 
465 Stinger missiles and 55 dual-mounted launch systems 
110 Mk-46 Mod 5 Torpedoes 
30 TH-67 training helicopters and 30 AN/AVS-6 NVG sets 
-             







21 AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters 
13 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Armed Scout helicopters 
54 Harpoon anti-ship missiles 





              
$81 million    
1998 
9 CH-47SD Chinook helicopters 
3 Knox-class frigates and 1 Mk-15 Phalanx CIWS 
61 dual-mount Stinger SAMs 
28 Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation/targeting pods for F-16s 
58 Harpoon anti-ship missiles 








2 E-2T Hawkeye AWACS 
5 AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS radio systems, 5 Intelligence EW systems, 
and 5 HMMWVs 
240 AGM-114KS Hellfire II air-to-ground missiles 
$400 million 




Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE) communications 
146 M109A5 howitzers, 152 SINCGARS radio systems 
71 RGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship missiles 
39 Pathfinder/sharpshooter navigation/targeting pods for F-16s 
200 AIM-120C AMRAAMs for F-16s 
48 AN/ALQ-184 ECM pods for F-16s 
162 HAWK intercept guided air defense missiles 









Table 2.   U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan, 1996-2000114 
 
As compared with the previous time period, the purchases from 1996 to 2000 no longer 
reflect a significant concern for air defense, at least until 2000, with the highly 
encouraged radar and air defense missiles.  Much of the equipment procured from the 
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United States points toward defense against a ground attack and support of ground forces.  
The increase in purchases of torpedoes and frigates, as well as the large number of 
Harpoon missiles, reflects growing concern over PLAN submarine and surface assets. 
3. Overall Capability Spread 
As of 2000, the PRC’s offensive capability was still rather limited.  James Nolt, a 
Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute specializing in East Asian relations, has 
published numerous papers and articles pertaining to PRC-ROC issues and military 
balance.  In his January 2000 paper, “The China-Taiwan Military Balance,” he conveyed 
his opinion that though the PRC could certainly harass Taiwan, a full-scale invasion was 
not likely to succeed.115  Even harassment options are not likely to have a decisive 
outcome, as a blockade or missile attacks would not be effective in forcing a resolution.   
The main issue preventing a PRC military victory over Taiwan is a quality gap.  
Taiwan’s equipment is much more advanced and of a higher quality than that of the PRC, 
giving Taiwan a distinct advantage, even without U.S. support.  Additionally, the PRC’s 
strength and capability up through 2000 was in the PLA ground forces, which would 
have to cross the Taiwan Strait and conduct a successful amphibious landing prior to 
being effective.  The PRC does not have the sea transport capability to cross the Taiwan 
Strait with its plentiful troops and supplies, nor does the PLAAF have a sufficient 
capability to transport troops, not to mention that it would take significant suppression of 
anti-air defenses for even an attempt.  In any scenario, the build-up of troops on Taiwan 
would not be fast enough to prevent Taiwan’s twenty-four division army from 
successfully resisting.116 
What Taiwan does lack is submarines, as U.S. nuclear submarines are not 
exported, and are too expensive regardless, and European powers are hesitant to rile the 
PRC by selling their technology to Taiwan.  This is an advantage for the PRC, as the 
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Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities of the PRC are limited, while Taiwan’s 
ASW capabilities are significant.  According to James Nolt: 
Taiwan has 32 land-based ASW aircraft to [the PRC’s] four (plus four 
obsolete flying boats).  Nearly all of Taiwan’s 37 major warships carry a 
helicopter and all 24 new frigates are equipped with towed sonar, whereas 
only nine PLAN warships carry a helicopter and even less have towed 
sonar.117 
This difference in capabilities helps to keep the submarine impact balanced, as Taiwan is 
able to effectively defend against the PRC’s growing submarine fleet, while the PRC 
does not have to be concerned about ASW capabilities as much due to Taiwan’s 
difficulty procuring submarines.   
 Taiwan at this time was also planning on purchasing four Aegis destroyers, which 
have far superior anti-air capabilities to anything in the PRC’s inventory.118  While the 
PRC was planning on procuring two Sovremenny destroyers from Russia, the abilities of 
the Sovremenny would be somewhat balanced by the Aegis destroyers, as the destroyers 
can link with other assets in order to maintain sufficient stand-off from Sovremenny 
destroyers.  In 2000, however, while the Clinton administration chose to sell precision-
guided missiles and ground-based early warning radar, it decided not to sell Aegis 
destroyers or P-3Cs until Taiwan’s credible needs could be evaluated.119   
The balance of power during this time period still favored Taiwan over the PRC, 
though the capabilities pursued by the PRC throughout this time period indicate that the 
PRC was beginning to close the gap.  The relative decrease in defense spending by the 
ROC as compared to the PRC, as well as the comparative abilities of weapons systems 
produced and procured demonstrate the narrowing of the gap.  Despite this narrowing, 
nuclear weapons remained the PRC’s only option to unquestionably recover Taiwan – the 
outcome would certainly be undesirable, as the island would be left uninhabitable.120   
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D. CONCLUSION 
The trends throughout this time period demonstrate increasing democratic 
liberalization which was furthered by the uniquely democratic characteristic of 
accountability,121 causing electorates to affect the goals and at times the ideals of their 
political parties.  While all of the parties in the pan-green camp favored independence, 
the degree to which they did so was fettered by a desire to gain votes in elections.  The 
moving to the middle by the two big parties likely contributed to DPP’s success in 2000.  
The overall trend for this IV is neither completely positive nor negative during this time 
period.  The DPP backing away from independence rhetoric is definitely negative; 
however, President Lee’s growing talk of sovereignty reflects a positive trend for the IV.  
This period will therefore be coded as being negative at the beginning and becoming 
more positive as it progressed. 
The level of U.S. support throughout this period shifted as well.  At first, 
following the Strait Crisis, Washington strove to ensure Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.  
While this support was perhaps an effort to avoid U.S. involvement in a conflict, it 
definitely supported Washington’s policy regarding the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
question.  The United States also, for the first time since Taiwan’s democratic transition, 
actively influenced Taiwan’s actions by denouncing Lee’s “two-states” theory as 
provocative and a unilateral measure to alter the status quo, an action Washington does 
not support.  This demonstrates an overall negative trend through this time period in the 
IV, as the period started with significant support, but decreased throughout. 
Coincident with both the introduction of wavering support and increasing 
vocalization by Taiwan’s political parties and leaders, the PRC increased spending and 
started gaining strength.  While this growth did not take tip the balance away from 
Taiwan, it will be coded as less positive than the previous chapter, as the PRC was 
closing the gap.  The Taiwan Strait Crisis is also significant in the coding of this IV, as 
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the show of force at the beginning of this evaluation period definitely had a negative 
impact on the DV and Taiwan’s domestic politics IV.    
Taiwan’s independence policy (DV) still changed very little during this time; 
however the movement of the parties to the center of the independence-reunification 
continuum demonstrates that the actions taken by the PRC during the Taiwan Strait Crisis 
did serve to affect Taiwan’s domestic politics and thus the official policies its leaders 
promoted.  Though the shift trends noted above in the IVs started in the late 1990s, the 
subsequent chapter will show the continuation of each of these trends and determine their 
effect on Taiwan’s independence policy.   
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IV. 2001-2007:  THE CHEN ADMINISTRATION 
The year 2001 is significant as a starting point for the final period of analysis not 
only due to the ascension of Chen Shui-bian and the DDP to the presidency in 2000, but 
also due to the inauguration of the George W. Bush Administration in Washington in 
January 2001.  Initial indicators pointed to a favorable lean in Washington towards 
Taiwan, and with pro-independence forces in control of the presidency it seemed Chen 
would be able to institute his goals.  However, President Chen Shui-bian and the DPP 
discovered very quickly upon taking office that the position of president was not the 
powerful position they thought it would be.  The source of the KMT’s successful 
consolidation of power was in holding the position of president, while enjoying a political 
majority in the Legislative Yuan.122  This severely limited President Chen’s ability to 
directly influence ROC policy.   
   The domestic politics within Taiwan shifted yet again during this time period, 
particularly with the addition of two other parties.  An examination of these shifts in 
policy and rhetoric of the parties and politics overall provides some insight to the factors 
that affected these shifts.  The changing level of U.S. support is evaluated next, as an 
initially favorable administration in Washington changed rather rapidly, due both to 
international events and tensions created by Taipei.  The extent and import of these shifts 
assists in determining their affect on Taiwan’s independence policy.  Lastly, the military 
balance between the ROC and PRC is evaluated, as the PRC’s increase in spending in the 
late 1990s begins to translate into an increase in capability as this time period begins.  
This growth is examined with regards to the ROC’s inability to work out political 
differences to ensure adequate defense.  The evaluation of the interconnectedness of these 
three independent variables provides a clearer picture of how each affected Taiwan’s 
independence policy, as well as the other variables. 
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A. ROC DOMESTIC POLITICS AND MOVEMENTS 
President Lee was unable to form a cohesive KMT policy prior to the 2000 
presidential election, resulting in the loss of the election, and the lack of a unified party 
position.  This section evaluates the continuing challenges in Taiwan’s pan-blue versus 
pan-green domestic politics – reunification versus independence – and assesses the 
overall impact of the DPP’s leadership on Taiwan’s independence policy. 
1. Pan-Blue Political Parties, Goals, and Rhetoric 
Lee’s successor as KMT chairman, Lien Chan, proposed a confederation as a 
solution to the Taiwan Question, as opposed to merely reunification.  This proposal 
would provide for “separate jurisdiction” for each state, while joining them under a 
“common roof” – considerably more independent than the “one country, two systems” in 
operation in Hong Kong and favored by Beijing for Taiwan.123  Following Beijing’s 
subsequent opposition to Lien Chan’s proposal, the KMT reverted to the approach of the 
Guidelines for National Unification established in 1991.  What emerges is a policy of 
“Taiwan-first,” that if reunification occurs, it will be decided by the people of Taiwan, 
and not to the detriment of its citizens.124  With the New Party (NP) slowly fading away, 
the KMT alone maintains a positive outlook of reunification, while still looking for 
methods that benefit Taiwan above all else.  Most importantly, however, is that the KMT 
still promotes ties with the PRC, a policy component that is significantly lacking in the 
DPP. 
Even though its policies are not as strict on reunification as they used to be, the 
NP continues to lose voters.  Still promoting reunification, it increasingly looks for a 
course allowing more diplomatic freedom than “one country, two systems” would 
provide.125  Gunter Schubert summed up the NP’s official reunification policy as: 
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Taiwan’s future is unification with China, but this must not happen to the 
detriment of Taiwan’s political and economic liberties.  Unification is 
contingent upon China’s democratic development and can only be a result 
of gradual rapprochement between the two sides.  The “one country, two 
systems” formula can be negotiated, but it is not a precondition to any 
final deal.126 
It is perhaps this inability to effectively declare an official posture that is causing the NP 
to lose followers and collapse as a political party. 
Following the 2000 presidential election, the KMT and NP were joined in the 
pan-blue camp by the People’s First Party (PFP) – formed by the 2000 independent 
presidential candidate James Soong.127  The PFP attempts to stay in the center on most 
issues it recognizes the history and “consciousness” of Taiwan, while maintaining the 
cultural and historical roots between Taiwan and the mainland.  Additionally, it calls for 
recognition of the one-China principle in Taiwan, while encouraging flexibility on the 
part of Beijing for interpretation of separate governments, in much the same way as the 
European Union.  This policy attempts to strengthen ties with the mainland while 
maintaining national identity.128  While playing a large role for most of the decade, the 
PFP has largely merged back into the KMT following the retirement of James Soong as 
chairman, though some candidates in the recent elections still ran on a PFP ticket.129 
The KMT has also taken actions in recent years to further relations with Beijing 
directly.  Lien Chan, as well as other KMT politicians, have visited Beijing to further 
trade and communication.130  This new policy of the KMT serves to not only increase the 
economic ties and subsequent growth, but also promotes stability in the region.  As Kerry 
Dumbaugh notes, “the KMT has portrayed itself as a more responsible steward than the 
DPP for Taiwan’s future” and further, blames the DPP for increased tensions and 
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promises to pursue a “policy of engagement.”131  The KMT’s policy of engagement 
would not only ease tensions, but also increase economic ties that are currently limited. 
2. Pan-Green Political Parties, Goals, and Rhetoric 
A newcomer to the pan-green coalition, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), was 
founded in 2001 and is essentially the Lee Teng-hui version of the KMT.  The TSU, like 
many of the parties, puts the interests of the Taiwanese people first, but does refute the 
“one China” principle.132  According to Shelley Rigger, the TSU was formed by Lee “for 
the express purpose of helping Chen govern effectively,” which it did by increasing the 
total number of pan-green seats in the LY in December 2001.133 
The DPP has been criticized since the election of President Chen Shui-bian for 
jeopardizing the status quo.  For the first few years of Chen’s presidency, the status quo 
was maintained, however just prior to the 2004 elections, President Chen promoted the 
adoption of a new constitution.  Considering the DPP’s official platform is “one China, 
one Taiwan,” the status quo was definitely threatened.134  In 2004, President Chen Shui-
bian decided to hold a referendum along with the presidential election.  While this was a 
dramatic step forward for democracy in Taiwan, the referendum asked the public to vote 
on whether Taiwan should insist that the PRC give up its claimed right to use force – an 
action easily viewed as a step toward independence.135   
The Referendum Law itself that led up to the 2004 defense referendum also 
caused much consternation between the two camps.  The KMT-PFP coalition preferred a 
“prescribed” referendum, which would be subject to laws and procedure, ensuring due 
process over the life of a particular referendum.  The DPP, on the other hand, preferred a 
more “discretionary” referendum which would allow the public or leaders to call for 
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referendums at will.136  The pan-blue camp was quick to call attention to the DPP’s 
proposal as a means to declare independence at any time.  The KMT-PFP proposal 
additionally did not allow government agencies to call for referendums, effectively 
preventing the DPP from superseding the Legislative Yuan by calling for a popular 
vote.137  The pan-blue coalition succeeded in limiting the DPP with the final version of 
the Referendum Law, by denying referendums pertaining to “sovereignty, territory, and a 
new constitution.”  Additionally, the Law also forbids referendums to change the 
“country’s name, flag, and national anthem.”138 
After President Chen Shui-bian and the DPP won the presidency again in 2004, 
they continued provoking the PRC.  In response to the PRC’s passing of the anti-
succession law in March 2005 and the DPP’s defeat in the December 2005 elections, 
President Chen “announced that the National Unification Council…would ‘cease to 
function’ and that the National Unification Guidelines…would ‘cease to apply.’”139  In 
addition to refusing to clarify that the Council and Guidelines were not entirely abolished, 
as Washington demanded, Chen followed only two months later with the assertion that:   
For the past 50 years, it has been abundantly clear to the world that there is 
only one China.  Indeed, there is only one China, a totalitarian China.  But 
at the same time, there is also a democratic Taiwan.  For the past half-
century, the status quo in the Taiwan Strait has been that there is one 
democratic Taiwan and one totalitarian China, and neither of these two has 
had effective jurisdiction over the other.  Each has its own national 
moniker, national flag, constitution, government, armed forces, and 
judicial system.  Indeed, they are two separate countries.140 
The DPP and President Chen view Taiwan as a “de jure sovereign state,” meaning that 
independence does not need to be declared, as it is already independent.141  While some  
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in the pan-green camp, former president Lee Teng-hui included, favor immediate moves 
towards de jure independence, senior DPP officials wish to avoid losing U.S. support and 
retribution by the PRC.142 
 President Chen and other pan-green allies have tried to use the DPP presidency to 
solidify Taiwan’s sovereign identity due to concerns of political power after the elections 
in 2008.143  The DPP has taken action to increase membership in international 
organizations, such as the WHO, as a “normal country,” including a referendum to join 
the UN under the name of “Taiwan.”144  It appears that the public has spoken however, 
both by its lack of positive participation in the UN referendums and by the election of Ma 
Ying-jeou on March 22, 2008.145 
In the year prior to the 2008 presidential election, another sovereignty issue arose 
with the discussion over the route of the Olympic torch on its way to Beijing.  Taipei 
rejected the route chosen by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as Beijing used 
“Taiwan, China” rather than Taiwan’s official Olympic name – Chinese Taipei.146  The 
inability to resolve the wording and routing satisfactorily for both sides resulted in the 
Olympic Torch bypassing Taiwan.147 
3. Independence Policy 
The convergence of the parties in the middle of the independence-reunification 
continuum seen in the late 1990s, leading up to the 2000 election, was drastically 
reversed leading up to the 2004 election.  According to Wu Yu-shan, each of the parties 
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“repositioned themselves on the mainland China policy map to maximize their votes.”148  
Even the KMT established themselves on the independence side of the map, or at a 
minimum in the self-determination camp.  While the parties adjusted rhetoric to aid in 
winning the election in 2004, the actual official policy on independence did not change.  
However, this period does represent the most pro-independence period to date.  With the 
KMT shifting toward a pro-independence stance, the driving forces behind Taiwan’s 
independence policy were certainly leaning more toward independence, if not actually 
changing policy.  Wu Yu-shan’s illustration below demonstrates this shift in party 
ideology toward independence just prior to the 2004 elections and referendum: 
 
Figure 7.   “Racing toward Referenda, 2003-04” (From:  Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic 
Politics”)149 
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Under DPP leadership, Taipei continued to practice pragmatic diplomacy and 
pursue membership in international organizations.  Taiwan was accepted into the WTO in 
January 2002 as a separate customs territory, under the name “Chinese Taipei” – 
following the accession of the PRC in December 2001 in accordance with Beijing’s 
wishes to be accepted before Taiwan.150  Many actions taken to increase international 
representation throughout this time period seem provocative, though Taipei had always 
attempted to join international organizations.  What makes the attempts in this most 
recent time period unique is the Taipei’s increasing insistence to apply for membership 
under the name of Taiwan, rather than names that do not infer sovereignty.  These and 
other actions by the DPP, such as the 2004 referendum, represent excursions toward 
independence; however President Chen always stopped short of changing the official 
independence policy.  The following section will illuminate this finding further, as the 
effect of the level of U.S. support on Taipei’s actions is evaluated. 
B. LEVEL OF UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO ROC 
As noted above, Washington continues to have a significant impact on actions by 
Taipei.  This section examines stresses on the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, such as the 2001 
defense package and political interventions to reduce tensions caused by Chen Shui-bian, 
and their resulting impact on U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan. 
1. Status of 2001 Defense Package 
A defense package for Taiwan approved by the Bush Administration in 2001 
included:  diesel submarines, P-3C Orion ASW aircraft, Mk-48 torpedoes, Harpoon 
submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, howitzers, amphibious assault vehicles 
(AAVs), electronic counter-measures (ECM) systems for existing F-16s, MH-53 
helicopters for minesweeping, and four decommissioned Kidd-class destroyers.151  The 
Aegis destroyers were deferred again along with the decision on M1A2 Abrams tanks 
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and AH-64 Apache Longbow helicopters – though the tanks were approved later in 2001, 
and the helicopters were approved in 2002.152 
Other parts of the package also began the LY approval process one at a time.  In 
2003, after negotiating a fifteen percent price decrease with the U.S. Navy, the LY 
granted the funds for purchasing four Kidd-class destroyers, which were delivered in 
2005 to 2006.153  The requested diesel submarines had a number of issues, not the least 
of which being that the United States does not operate or manufacture diesel submarines.  
The main issue came down to the price of the submarine package, and Taiwan’s desire to 
build new, rather than obtain decommissioned submarines, to foster domestic 
participation.154  For defense against the PRC’s SRBM battery across the Strait, the LY 
approved – after much negotiation and price cuts – spending for upgrades to the existing 
Patriot PAC-2 system and in December 2007, funding for four PAC-3 systems.155 
Throughout this time period, the 2001 defense package was a source of constant 
tension between Washington and Taipei.156  The package was repeatedly blocked by pan-
blue legislators.157  In June 2007, the LY finally included at least initial procurements of 
the defense package in the budget, including P-3C Orion aircraft, upgrades to the Patriot 
missile system, and research into procurement of diesel submarines.158  Taiwan’s delay 
in processing the arms package damaged Taiwan’s credibility and led some in 
Washington to feel that Taiwan is not committed to its own defense, while officials in 
Taipei retort that only Taipei can decide which weapons it needs from the United 
States.159   
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2. Support for Political Movements and Political Interventions 
The United States was very supportive of Taiwan during the first couple of years 
of Chen’s presidency.  While major items, such as an official visit and free trade 
agreement were put off by Washington, the Bush administration continued to express 
strong support for Taiwan.160  This goodwill did not last long due to Chen’s inability to 
consolidate the legislature to buy arms from the United States, and his 2002 remarks 
about relations between the PRC and the ROC.  Chen threatened that Taiwan would “go 
its own way,” then further described the situation as one “country on each side” of the 
Taiwan Strait.161  While Washington maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity, President 
Chen’s remarks begged reproach; and the quick actions taken by U.S. officials helped 
alleviate much of the unnecessary increase in tension.162 
The Bush administration has been increasingly apprehensive with political 
movements and strategies in Taiwan, as President Chen’s more aggressive moves hinder  
U.S. policy options.163  The eagerness of the Bush Administration to support Taiwan has 
been waning.  Though a close relationship with Taiwan is still desirable, Kerry 
Dumbaugh reports that “U.S. officials now appear to be balancing criticisms of the PRC 
military buildup opposite Taiwan with periodic cautions and warnings to the effect that 
U.S. support for Taiwan is not unconditional, but has limits.”164   
Washington continued it suppression of Chen Shui-bian following the contentious 
presidential election in 2004.  All of the parties had begun promoting a new constitution 
and self-determination of Taiwan, but Washington was quick to act to maintain the status 
quo.  As Wu Yu-shan points out, “[a]s Chen’s presidential campaign deviated into the 
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‘forbidden zone’, U.S. officials began to raise their voices and issue statements of 
disapproval.”165  Following his reelection, Chen quickly made moves to alleviate 
tensions across the Strait and reconcile with the Bush Administration.   
In 2007, President Chen continued to induce tension in U.S.-Taiwan relations by 
announcing his “four wants:” “independence, an official name change to ‘Taiwan,’ a new 
constitution, and greater economic development.”166  The Chairman of the DPP followed 
this announcement by stating that Taipei should abandon Chen’s “five noes” pledged in 
2000.  Officials in Washington were quick to respond and cautioned Chen to uphold his 
commitments, and have stated opposition to any moves that would appear to alter the 
status quo.167 
Throughout this time period, Taiwan has continued its pursuit of membership in a 
multitude of organizations, but support from the United States varies and is not always 
guaranteed.  For example, Washington supported Taipei’s membership in the WTO, to 
which it was accepted in 2002, and many in Congress support an “observer” status in the 
World Health Organization (WHO) – particularly following the SARS and avian flu 
outbreaks.168  In 2007 however, leading up to the 2008 presidential election, President 
Chen introduced two initiatives that were not supported by the United States.  Chen 
applied for membership to the WHO yet again, however this time the request was for 
regular membership as “Taiwan,” rather than observer status as in previous attempts.  Not 
surprisingly the World Health Assembly (WHA) denied Taiwan’s request 148-17.  The 
United States, which had typically supported observer status for Taiwan voted against the 
initiative due to its “one China” policy.169  The second initiative was a referendum for the 
public to vote on whether Taiwan should apply for membership to the UN as “Taiwan,” 
which the United States also would not support.170 
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3. Willingness to Defend Taiwan 
A number if indicators seemed to point to a change away from “strategic 
ambiguity” early in the George W. Bush Administration.  First and foremost was a public 
statement by President Bush in 2001 that “the United States would do ‘whatever it took 
to help Taiwan defend herself.’”171  Shortly following this statement, relations seemed to 
continue to warm with the observation of military exercises by U.S. military personnel in 
2001 and the stationing of U.S. military personnel, including a defense attaché, in Taiwan 
in 2002.  This level of cooperation had been nonexistent since 1979.172  The Bush 
Administration also granted Taiwan’s Defense Minister a visa in 2002, yet another first, 
as no ROC defense minister had been granted a visa, other than for transit, since 1979.173 
The United States has increased its military representation at Taiwan’s military 
exercises since 2001; to not only advise on training issues, but also in an effort to 
coordinate maneuvers and evacuations in the event of U.S. participation in a Taiwan 
Strait conflict.174  Most troubling however, is the increasing appearance that Taiwan 
lacks the motivation to increase its own defense capabilities – leaving the United States 
as the sole source of momentum behind its advancements.175 
Following President Chen Shui-bian’s termination of the NUC and its Guidelines 
in February 2006, Washington demanded clarification from Taipei that they were not 
abolished entirely.176  Washington viewed President Chen’s actions as violating the “five 
noes” that Chen promised in 2000 – that the “abolition” of the NUC and Guidelines 
would “not be an issue.”177  As the United States viewed the lack of clarification as a 
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change in the status quo, and Taipei continued to avoid the issue, Senator John Warner – 
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee – stated that “if conflict were 
precipitated ‘by just inappropriate and wrongful politics generated by the Taiwanese 
elected officials, I’m not entirely sure that this nation would come full force to their 
rescue…’”178  President Chen did eventually provide clarification that the Council was 
not abolished three months later, in June 2006.179 
While Taiwan has been taking steps to ensure its own defense, the level of 
support from the United States has definitely waned as Taipei policy increasingly 
threatens the status quo.  Thus far the period from 2001 to 2007 has seen an increase in 
independence leaning rhetoric and a decrease in level of U.S. support.  A close 
examination of the military balance during this time will complete the picture of 
Taiwan’s security. 
C. MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN PRC AND ROC 
As highlighted above, Taiwan had significant political issues that prevented the 
approval of the 2001 defense package from the United States.  While Taipei was 
negotiating budgets, the PRC was increasing both acquisitions and indigenous 
production.  The following section examines the capabilities of both the PRC and ROC 
and assesses any changes to the overall capability spread. 
1. PRC Procurements and Developments 
Analysts increasingly believe that the PLA is modernizing more rapidly than 
Taiwan’s military, threatening a shift in the military balance.180  Several factors 
contribute to the increase in the pace of modernization, but possibly the most important is 
Moscow’s willingness to sell its aging inventory.  Since 2001, Beijing has purchased and 
received delivery of additional Su-30s, Kilo submarines, two Sovremenny destroyers, IL-
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76 transport aircraft, IL-78 tanker aircraft, and surface to air missile (SAM) systems.181  
The EU would have furthered PLA modernization as well, as it had planned to lift its 
arms embargo in 2005, but the passing of the anti-secession law delayed that action.182 
While the PLA cannot yet benefit from European technologies, it is benefiting 
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Figure 8.   PRC Defense Expenditure 2001-2007183 
 
The stagnation in defense spending appears to be over as the announced budget, and thus 
the estimates of actual PRC spending, have steadily increased in recent years. 
The PLAAF enjoys improved inventory with the additional purchases of Russian 
Su-27s and Su-30s.  Indigenous production also continues to improve with increasingly 
accurate land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) such as the DH-10 and the J-10 fighter, 
inducted into the PLAAF in 2006.184  Additionally, PRC acquisition of the Russian S-
300MU-2 SAM system that reaches into Taiwan's airspace provides a significant 
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advantage over even Taiwan's advanced generation fighters.185  The PLAN has also 
acquired the SS-N-27B supersonic anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) for use on its Kilo 
submarines.186  The Sovremenny destroyers are of particular interest to U.S. forces, as the 
Sovremenny is equipped with the SS-N-22 Sunburn missile – designed to successfully 
penetrate the Aegis air defense shield that protects U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups.187 
2. ROC Procurements and Developments 
Despite an increase to 2.6 percent of GDP in 2007, Taiwan’s defense budget 
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Figure 9.   Taiwan Defense Expenditure, 2001-2007189 
 
While actual defense spending appears to have changed very little over this time period, 
the value of defense expenditure dropped as compared to a GDP that was not growing as 
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rapidly as it had in the past.  This indicates that the proportion of spending on defense by 
the Taipei government decreased up until approval of the defense package in 2007. 
 Funding for defense has been the primary issue facing Taiwan during this time 
period, as the economy experienced reduced growth.190  This is reflected in the decreased 
defense budget in 2003, to $7.2 billion, with its continuing decline as a percentage of 
GDP – 2.6 percent in 2003 as compared to 4.72 percent in 1993.191  Additionally, an 
increasing amount of the defense budget is used for personnel costs, 54.54 percent in 
2003, which dramatically reduces funds available for research and procurement.192   
Taiwan purchased $13.9 billion in arms from 1998 to 2005, of which more than 
$10 billion came from the United States.  Other countries from which Taiwan procured 
weapons included Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands; though, these 
countries have since ceased selling arms to Taiwan.193  Two early warning radar sites 
were recommended and approved for sale by the Clinton Administration but the LY only 
approved an expenditure of $800 million for one site in November 2003.194 
A recent defense request in February 2007 included AMRAAM and Maverick 
missiles, worth $421 million.195  The MND has stated a priority for procuring additional 
F-16s, which was requested following the passage of the 2001 U.S. defense package in 
June 2007.196  The discussion above with regards to the 2001 defense package details the 
timeline of Taiwan's procurements.  The primary concern with these acquisitions is that it 
increasingly seems that Taiwan is becoming less capable of defending itself without the 
pressure and involvement of the United States.  
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3. Overall Capability Spread 
While waiting for the 2001 arms package to be approved by the Legislative Yuan, 
Washington was concerned that Taiwan was not improving its missile defenses rapidly 
enough to contend with the growing short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) deployments 
by the PRC.  This led to the 2004 sale of early warning radar systems to Taiwan by the 
United States.197  The approximately one thousand SRBMs deployed across the Strait 
pose a significant threat to Taiwan’s security.  This battery is comprised of CSS-6 and 
CSS-7 missiles, with ranges of 600 and 300 kilometers, respectively, as depicted in the 
image below from the Department of Defense annual report on PRC military power: 
 
Figure 10.   Taiwan Strait SAM and SRBM Coverage (From: OSD, Military 
Power of the PRC) 198 
 
This arsenal, which benefits from the increasing reliability of PRC precision guidance, 
poses a significant threat to important facilities; such as: military bases and 
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communications, transportation, and utilities infrastructure.  Of further concern is that 
this arsenal continues to grow by over 100 missiles each year.199 
There are a growing number of obstacles to Taiwan's self-defense.  One of the 
most serious obstacles to defense procurement has been political deadlock between pan-
blue and pan-green coalitions.200  Another growing concern for Taiwan’s defense is 
military support for government policies.  As the military was closely tied to the KMT 
during the years of martial law, it is very difficult for the DPP to be guaranteed military 
support for policies that may provoke an attack by the PRC.201  Yet another critical issue 
facing Taiwan is man-power, noted by Michael Chase who highlights Taiwan’s trouble 
“maintaining a sufficient number of qualified fighter pilots in the Taiwan Air Force.”202 
Taiwan's Air Force also faces other problems, such as the growing capabilities of 
the PLA in contrast to Taiwan's aging fleet of fighter aircraft.  In trying to anticipate the 
growing capabilities of the PLA, the Clinton Administration approved a request for 200 
AMRAAMs for Taiwan's F-16s.  Taiwan did not purchase the entire allotment, only 120, 
which many analysts believe will not be sufficient to counter the PRC threat.  
Washington has also encouraged procurement of SLAMRAAMs in expectation of PLA 
LACM capabilities.203  Additionally, though Taiwan possesses advanced fighters, in 
order to keep its inventory parallel with increasing PLAAF capabilities, Taiwan will need 
to replace its aging F-5s and Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDFs).204 
As part of the change in military strategy that places greater emphasis on effective 
deterrence, Taiwan has been moving forward with plans to develop and deploy short and 
medium-rang ballistic missiles, as well as land-attack cruise missiles.205  Taiwan’s 
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offensive missile capability was confirmed by use of the Hsiung Feng 2E LACM during 
the Han Kuang 23 military exercise in April 2007.206  However, despite this focus on 
effective deterrence and resolute defense, Taiwan has still not taken steps to improve its 
joint capabilities – it predominately relies on the navy to combat naval assets, air force 
versus air force, and ground forces to combat ground forces.207  This strategy also 
hinders the appropriation of defense spending as inter-service rivalries prevent agreement 
on how funding should be spent.   
In order to maintain the narrow margin of superiority it has over a rapidly closing 
PRC, Taiwan must improve its inter-service rivalries and its command, control, and 
communication structure.  While the PRC did not close the gap completely in this time 
period, it has closed the gap to a point that should be alarming to officials in Taipei.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The trends throughout this final time period evaluated demonstrate most 
significantly both an increase in the role of the United States in Taiwan policy and an 
increase in the strength of the PLA in relation to ROC forces.  Yet again, ROC political 
parties shifted their positions in order to attract voters, and individual players were 
swayed at times by actions from either Washington or Beijing.  The United States started 
out supportive, which more than likely gave President Chen the confidence to take some 
seemingly more drastic measures, such as his 2002 remarks referring to Taiwan as a 
country and suggesting that Taiwan would go its own way.  The decrease in U.S. support 
throughout the time period results in a negative impact of the IV. 
On the military front, Taiwan’s domestic political rivalries prevented Taiwan 
from acquiring sufficient weapons for defense.  The package approved for sale by 
Washington took six years to make it through Taiwan’s approval process in its entirety; 
meanwhile, the PRC was steadily acquiring and developing assets, and training with 
those assets while Taiwan delayed.  This is not to say that the PRC achieved the 
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capability to reclaim Taiwan by force, but it has made great strides toward catching up 
with Taiwan militarily.  Though the gap may not be closed, the combination of actions 
taken by Taipei and Beijing during this time period certainly prevented the gap from 
widening in Taiwan’s favor – perhaps permanently. 
The official independence policy made some excursions toward independence, 
but in fact changed very little.  One of the ways the excursion toward independence can 
be noted is the method with which the ROC applied to the United Nations.  The ROC has 
been applying for membership to international organizations since democratization, but it 
is during Chen’s reign that the requests became more provocative, with proposals to join 
under the name of Taiwan, a move certain to spark tension across the Strait.  It is these 
subtle nuances in wording that give insight to the desired direction of Taiwan’s official 
independence policy. 
One interesting thing to note about this final time period is the effect each of the 
independent variables had on the others.  When the U.S. level of support for Taiwan 
shifted, it did so more obviously than in the past, with public denunciations of Chen’s 
proposals, or government officials double checking the wording of a speech prior to 
Chen’s delivery.  These actions helped to not only keep Taiwan’s independence policy at 
the status quo, but also served to sway the domestic politics in Taiwan.  Another example 
of this interconnectedness is the political rivalries that prevented the 2001 defense 
package from being approved.  The pan-blue coalition was concerned that if the pan-
green camp enjoyed the benefits of security provided by the defense sale, that Chen 
would take even more antagonizing actions toward Beijing, jeopardizing the security of 
Taiwan.  This rivalry permitted Beijing the time to grow stronger at a time when U.S. 
support was already low, the outcome of which is best demonstrated by the elections in 
March 2008, which is evaluated further in the concluding chapter. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Samuel P. Huntington states that the true consolidation of democracy is 
determined by the “two-turnover test.”208  The ROC satisfied the conditions for the first 
turnover in 2000 with the direct election of President Chen Shui-bian of the DPP.  On 
March 22, 2008, the successor party – the DPP – lost the power of president and on May 
20, 2008 constitutionally surrendered power back to the KMT with the election and 
inauguration of President Ma Ying-jeou.  While this turnover had previously happened at 
the mayoral level in 1998,209 2008 marks the first true success at the presidential level.  
This serves to demonstrate the stability of Taiwan’s democratic system and portends its 
likely continued success. 
Throughout the democratization process, the government of Taiwan avoided steps 
to explicitly declare independence.  To determine if it is likely to do so in the future, now 
that democratization is complete, this chapter will summarize the findings over the course 
of examination.  Further, this chapter will analyze the trends and relationships between 
the IVs and the DV and suggest areas for future study, as well as propose policy 
recommendations based on the findings of this research. 
A. FINDINGS 
Over the course of this survey, Taiwan’s policy at first appears to drift toward 
independence; however, Taiwan’s official policy has remained fairly constant since 1991, 
as Taiwan has not altered its constitution in such a significant way.  This section provides 
an overview of the shifts in the three IVs that influence the DV, as well as identify 
excursions toward independence throughout the time period evaluated. 
                                                 
208 Samuel P. Huntinton, The Third Wave:  Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 
OK:  University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 266-7, quoted in Dumbaugh, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential 
Election, 4. 
209 Chu and Diamond, "Taiwan's 1998 Elections," 821. 
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1. Independent Variables 
As noted in the preceding chapters, each of the independent variables changed 
over the course of study.  The following table provides a characterization of each of the 
IVs according to their resulting influence on independence over the time periods 
evaluated: 
 Domestic Politics U.S. Support Military Balance 
1991-1996 
Negative, but 
increasing Positive Positive 
1996-2001 
Negative, but 








Table 3.   Independent Variables by Time Period 
 
These trends reflect changes in the political and military relationships that affect not only 
the DV, but also the other IVs.  The domestic politics were at first influenced by 
increasing liberalization as a result of democratization.  However, as Chen Shui-bian 
became more provocative as the final time period progressed, the political entities within 
Taiwan made efforts to restrain independence leanings.  The level of U.S. commitment to 
Taiwan also decreased throughout the evaluation due to the efforts by some Taiwanese 
politicians to move beyond the status quo.  Lastly, the domestic politics influenced the 
PRC’s increase in modernization, and its subsequent growth served to restrain Taiwan’s 
domestic politics. 
One important aspect of politics to note is that it takes time to effect a change.  
This applies to comparative military strength as well as political movements, policies and 
even the ideals of a political party.  The trends noted in both ROC politics, and its 
independence policy, demonstrate that a specific trend had to build momentum prior to a 
shift in relative security becoming apparent.  This is particularly true when discussing the 
effect of the military balance, as it is can be many years after an acquisition that actual 
capabilities become a threat or issue. 
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The changing of political party platforms and movements based on relative 
security is a unique characteristic of democracy.  In a democratic system, the 
administration is held accountable for actions that place its constituents at risk, which 
causes the full implementation of its goals and policies to be restricted by the 
electorate.210  This helps reign in the most provocative parties and individuals in 
Taiwan’s case.  The failure of the DPP to adjust to the electorate’s desires cost it both the 
legislative and presidential elections.  As Benson and Niou noted, “public opinion 
influences political outcomes,” and both the U.S. level of support and the threat posed by 
the PRC militarily, affect public opinion in Taiwan on independence-reunification.211 
2. Dependent Variable 
The following table provides a summary of the major excursions toward 
independence as compared to Taiwan’s relative security as well as the outcome of those 
actions:   
Year Excursion Security Outcome 
1995 President Lee to Cornell High Taiwan Strait Crisis 




ceases & U.S. criticism 
2002 Chen refers to Taiwan as a country and suggests it should “go its own way” 
High, but 
declining 
U.S. criticism and start 
of declining support 
2004 
Chen proposes new constitution and 




Pan-Blue prevents new 
constitution and restricts 
referenda 






2006 NUC “cease to function” and Guidelines “cease to apply” Low 
U.S. demands 




Chen’s “four wants” – independence, name 
change to Taiwan, constitution and greater 
economic development 
Low U.S. criticism 
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“Taiwan Strait Update,” 4. 
 66
2008 Referendum to apply to UN as “Taiwan” Low 
Criticized by PRC & 
U.S. KMT alternative & 
boycott 
Table 4.   Excursions Towards Independence 
 
As noted above, the few excursions attempted toward independence occurred either when 
the military balance or U.S. support appeared to be in Taipei’s favor.  This does not seem 
to be the case at first when examining the trends after 2000, as President Chen was 
certainly leaning toward independence during his entire presidency, but Taiwan still 
possessed a military advantage over the PRC, regardless of the fact the PRC was closing 
the gap.  This supports initial analysis that the ROC would likely take provocative steps 
towards independence before the PRC is able to completely catch up, but that is when the 
United States takes action. 
As the PRC grew in strength and U.S. support wavered, not only did officials 
back away from vocal challenges made to the status quo, but the political parties 
themselves actually shifted their stances on the independence-reunification continuum to 
attract voters.  This is most obvious in the recent election, where the KMT promised 
increased economic ties and negotiations with the PRC, painting the DPP’s dealings with 
the PRC as irresponsible.  While this shift did not vary significantly from traditional 
KMT rhetoric, it did win the election for the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou, and not by the slim 
margin the DPP had in the two previous elections, but by 2.2 million votes, or sixteen 
percent.212 
It may at first appear that the referendum on the ballot for the March 2008 
election was an excursion toward independence at a time when Taiwan’s level security 
was relatively low.  A closer inspection of the internal politics, however, provides a 
different picture.  The referendum was first proposed by Chen Shui-bian to request UN 
membership under the name Taiwan,213  but the government as a whole did not agree 
with the referendum.  In order to prevent a definitive move towards independence and 
maintain the status quo, the KMT not only backed another option – a referendum 
                                                 
212 Dumbaugh, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential Election, 1. 
213 Ibid., 2. 
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proposing joining under the name “Republic of China” or any other name deemed 
suitable – but also urged constituents to boycott the referendum.214  This provides yet 
another example of the strengthening democratic institutions, as Chen’s provocative 
actions were reigned in by his own Legislative Yuan – serving to constrain Taipei’s 
independence policy. 
3. Need for Further Study 
As the recent election was secured mainly on a platform of economic prosperity 
through increasing ties with the PRC, rather than security issues, an analysis of political-
economic implications would be an area worthy of further development.  Even while the 
findings indicate that relative security was an important determinant of Taiwan official 
policy, economic security and prosperity is perhaps just as important.  This author chose 
to evaluate the security aspect rather than the economic aspect due to the nature of the 
cross-Strait relationship.  The deployment of weapons and the reservation of the right to 
use force by Beijing, as well as the prospect of U.S. military support, lends well to a 
realist approach, using balance of power and rationalist theories.  While this approach 
was successful, the results of this research might have been different if trends in Taiwan’s 
economy had not mirrored the shifts in the independence-reunification leanings of the 
political parties and their constituents.   
B. ANALYSIS 
In order to determine the proper course of action for U.S. policy, it is helpful to 
identify which model of state behavior best explains Taipei’s actions.  One theory about 
the causes of war that seems to be most applicable to Taiwan’s precarious position is 
rationalist theory, which is based largely on neorealist principles.  One rationalist 
explanation for war is when states misinterpret each others’ willingness to fight.215  The 
                                                 
214 “The Significance of the March 22 Referendums,” Government Information Office, Republic of 
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current U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity takes full advantage of this notion – if Taiwan 
is certain that United States will intervene on its behalf, it may be more likely to provoke 
the PRC, and conversely, if the PRC is certain in United States nonintervention, Beijing 
might be more likely to take action against Taiwan.   
Another aspect of Fearon’s argument includes underestimating the others’ 
capabilities.216  This could also apply to Taiwan just prior to the Strait Crisis; however, 
with the exception of President Lee’s trip to the United States, Taiwan did not take any 
actions to deliberately provoke the PRC in that instance.  The actions taken since then, 
particularly since Chen Shui-bian’s election, do not seem to support either theory, as the 
PRC had already demonstrated both its willingness to use force and its growing 
capabilities.   
While Chen’s actions do not appear to support rationalist theory as described 
above, there is another aspect of rationalist explanations for wars – the theory that when 
the relative strength of two states appears to be reversing, the state that is becoming 
weaker will take actions while it is still stronger to demand concessions from the rising 
power.217  Chen’s attempts to change Taiwan’s official independence policy during the 
last few years could certainly be perceived as such; as the research has shown, and 
analysts agree, that the PRC is closing the capability gap.218  What this policy fails to 
take into account however is the effect of U.S. support, as most provocative actions taken 
by Chen that diminished Taiwan’s position from both Washington’s perspective, as well 
as Beijing’s, were quickly reversed. 
From this standpoint, can all of Taiwan’s shifts since 1991 be explained by 
rationalist theory?  It certainly seems so, as it was first underestimation of Beijing’s 
willingness to fight, followed by underestimation of capabilities, based on both the PRC’s 
rise and Washington’s conditional level of support.  The question becomes, can 
rationalist theory also explain Chen’s retreat from provocative stances at Washington’s 
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217 Ibid., 385. 
218 David Shambaugh, “A Matter of Time: Taiwan’s Eroding Military Advantage,” The Washington 
Quarterly, (Spring 2000), 119;  
 69
urging?  If the underlying assumptions that lead to an action are proved incorrect, then it 
would follow that a rational actor would in fact retreat from his initial stance.  It would 
appear that despite seemingly irrational acts, Chen, and the government in Taipei, are 
certainly rational actors.   
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The trends and analysis discussed above is beneficial to refining future U.S. 
policy options regarding Taiwan.  Current U.S. policy consists mainly of defense support 
for Taiwan, while deterring unilateral actions on both sides of the Strait through the 
policy of strategic ambiguity.  This was most recently demonstrated during Taiwan’s 
March elections, when Washington “responsibly positioned” two carrier strike groups 
(CSGs) in the region.219  The following policy recommendations will encompass defense 
support and the policy of strategic ambiguity, as well as a discussion of possible roles 
Washington consider as PRC-ROC negotiations begin anew. 
1. Future Defense Support for Taiwan 
When considering future defense support for Taiwan, it is important to consider 
the conflicting requirements of the 1982 Communiqué and the TRA.  The United States 
is committed to providing the means of defense for Taiwan, while reducing that support 
over time.  Over the course of the next year, that support is expected to be in the form of 
F-16C/Ds, P-3Cs, utility and attack helicopters, diesel submarine research and design, 
and upgrades to the Patriot system, including PAC-2 upgrades and PAC-3 missiles, as 
provided for in Taiwan’s FY 2008 defense budget.220 
What is uncertain is how U.S. support for defense will change under the new 
KMT Administration.  Some analysts feel that the new administration will seek to reduce 
military spending, in order to gain economic advantages through interactions with the 
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PRC, which potentially poses a significant threat to U.S. regional interests.221  Taiwan’s 
ability to follow through on arms sales has already been an issue in U.S.-Taiwan relations 
since 2001, and friendlier relations between Beijing and Taipei may place increasing 
strains on Taiwan’s relations with the United States. 
An additional point for consideration will continue to be the types of weapons 
sold to Taiwan.  The United States has historically avoided selling weapons of an 
offensive nature, and should continue to do so, in order to benefit both Sino-U.S. and 
U.S.-Taiwan relations.222  It is not likely that the new administration will request 
weapons of an offensive nature, however some systems that have already been approved 
for research and design can be viewed as offensive, such as submarines.  Perhaps the 
most controversial defense system is Theater Missile Defense (TMD).  As David 
Shambaugh accurately notes, the system would not provide adequate defense from 
Beijing’s CSS-6 and CSS-7 arsenals, yet would cause a large political controversy.223  As 
this research demonstrates, even the perception of invulnerability by Taiwan could prove 
disastrous – possibly prompting a formal declaration of independence – particularly if 
negotiations between the new KMT regime and Beijing deteriorate.  Additionally, given 
the recent demonstration by the United States of an Aegis cruiser destroying a low-earth 
orbiting (LEO) satellite, both TMD and Aegis destroyers should remain off the list for 
transfer to Taiwan. 
2. Strategic Ambiguity 
Thomas Christensen observes that Washington needs to “find the best possible 
balance of deterrence and reassurance.”224  As discussed above in the analysis section, 
the policy of strategic ambiguity currently provides sufficient deterrence for both Taipei 
and Beijing, and reassurance is currently accomplished through private and public 
statements Washington makes when one provokes the other.  The mutual assurance 
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aspect will more than likely be the most difficult to achieve.  Beijing must be assured of 
U.S. support in order to promote cooperation on the six-party talks and the War on 
Terror, while Taipei must be assured that it has not been abandoned in order to gain 
support for those same U.S. security objectives.225  Washington must continue to 
maintain this delicate balance in order to assure peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
question.   
3. PRC-ROC Negotiations 
The final aspect of U.S. policy that should be evaluated is the current position of 
non-involvement in negotiations between the PRC and ROC.  This has previously been to 
the benefit of both sides, though primarily Taiwan, as Washington’s six assurances in 
1982 specified that the United States would not “pressure Taiwan to enter negotiations” 
nor serve as a mediator between the two.226  While applying pressure to Taiwan is 
certainly not a recommended course of action, being involved in some capacity in 
negotiations if requested by Taiwan should certainly be considered.  As the preceding 
decade demonstrated, prompt actions taken by officials in Washington has increased 
stability in the cross-Strait relationship.  It is uncertain exactly what role Washington 
could play, but being prepared and willing to be involved could not only benefit Taiwan 
in future negotiations, but also allay U.S. regional security concerns about closer ties 
between Beijing and Taipei. 
D. SUMMARY 
A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be detrimental to not only those involved, 
but also to the East and Southeast Asian region as a whole.  Working multilaterally with 
both Beijing and Taipei will afford the best opportunity to prevent critical miscalculations 
that could lead to war.  As Kenneth Lieberthal stated: 
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the potential consequences [are] so dire, that all three major players should 
summon the courage to think creatively about how to prevent it.  Because 
neither Beijing nor Taipei is likely to make the first move even if they 
recognize such a plan’s potential benefits, Washington will have to jump-
start the process.227  
Current trends, as well as the new KMT administration, herald favorable conditions for a 
peaceful resolution to the Taiwan Question, but Washington must still be prepared to be 
as involved as necessary in upcoming negotiations, to assure an outcome that is agreeable 
to all.   
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